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Abstract
This Essay addresses collateral security structures and project financing structures used in
project financings where the structure of, and documentation for, the financing is compliant with
the precepts of Islamic Shari’ah. The Essay first provides a brief summary of the sources and
exposition of Shari’ah principles in financing transactions. It then surveys economic and financial
trends in Saudi Arabia promoting and supporting the project financings discussed in the Essay.
General legal considerations influencing development of the structure are then identified, including
the absence of a statutory structure, the inapplicability of stare decisis, and the fact that many laws
are not published. A critical factor in any project financing, particularly in a jurisdiction in which
Islamic law is predominant, relates to the available enforcement entities and paradigms and the
degree to which Islamic Shari’ah is the basis for interpretation and enforcement of agreements.
This Essay examines the enforcement regimen of Saudi Arabia and then examines three project
financing case studies.
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This Essay addresses collateral security structures and pro-
ject financing structures used in project financings where the
structure of, and documentation for, the financing is compliant
with the precepts of Islamic Shari'ah.' The Essay first provides a
brief summary of the sources and exposition of Shari'ah princi-
ples in financing transactions. It then surveys economic and fi-
nancial trends in Saudi Arabia promoting and supporting the
project financings discussed in the Essay. General legal consid-
erations influencing development of the structure are the identi-
fied, including the absence of a statutory structure, the inappli-
cability of stare decisis, and the fact that many laws are not pub-
lished. A critical factor in any project financing, particularly in a
jurisdiction in which Islamic law is predominant, relates to the
available enforcement entities and paradigms and the degree to
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lenders in the Saudi Chevron petrochemical project financing and led the team that
developed the rahn-adl collateral security structure discussed in this Essay. Mr. McMil-
len also represented the financiers in, and was Islamic counsel for, the sharikat
mahassa-murabaha financing discussed in this Essay and project and Islamic counsel for
the istisna'a-ijara transactions described in this Essay. Views expressed in this Essay are
those of Mr. McMillen and not those of King & Spalding or his previous law firm. All
copyright and other intellectual property rights in respect of this Essay are held by
Michael J.T. McMillen.
1. Portions of this Essay addressing the rahn-adl collateral security structure previ-
ously appeared in THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD HARVARD UNIVERSITY FORUM ON Is-
LAMIC FINANCE: LOCAL CHALLENGES, GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES 111-31 (2000) [hereinafter
THIRD HARVARD ISLAMIC FORUM]. A general description of the financing of the rahn-adl
structure in the Saudi Chevron petrochemical project financing appeared in Michael
J.T. McMillen, Special Report, Saudi Arabia, Briefing: Project Finance, Reconciling New Fund-
ing with the Sharia, 38 MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Sept. 18, 1999, at 36-39. A general descrip-
tion of the financing of the Maconda Park Project istisna'a-ojara transaction appeared in
Michael J.T. McMillen, Special Report U.S., Briefing: Islamic Finance: Breaking the Mould,
38 MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Sept. 22, 2000, at 28-29.
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which Islamic Shari'ah is the basis for interpretation and enforce-
ment of agreements. This Essay examines the enforcement regi-
men of Saudi Arabia and then examines three project financing
case studies. The first case study focuses on a Shari'ah-compliant
collateral security that was developed for, and implemented in,
the first limited recourse project financing in The Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Chevron Petrochemical Project. The
structure is a rahn-adl (mortgage/pledge-"trustee-arbitrator")
structure that is now used in the Middle East. The second case
study focuses on a sharikat mahassa-murabaha (joint venture-
bank purchase and sale) structure that was used in the financing
of an expansion to a power project and related transmission
equipment, in Saudi Arabia: the Utility Power Project. The final
two case studies examine a Shari'ah-compliant istisna'a-ijarai
(construction contract-lease) structure that was recently ef-
fected in the United States in the Maconda Park Apartments and
the Truman Park Apartments Projects and which will be effected
in various Islamic and non-Islamic jurisdictions. In each case,
the transactional participants and documentary structure are
considered in detail. In the case of the rahn-adl collateral secur-
ity structure, the methodology of the development of the struc-
ture is also examined in order to provide an indication of the
nature of structuring a transaction that bridges Western and Is-
lamic financial systems and their divergent credit, economic, le-
gal, and cultural parameters. The methodology is the opposite of
that used in structuring project financings in other jurisdictions,
commencing from the Islamic system and working to incorpo-
rate Western elements and, because it had not previously been
undertaken, began with first principles under the Shari'ah and
consideration of the nature of security interests in camels. Al-
though the two Saudi Arabian transactions involved structures
developed with primary sensitivity to the Hanbali School of Is-
lamic jurisprudence, the Essay discusses variations for implemen-
tation of the structures in other jurisdictions where other schools
of Islamic jurisprudence predominate.
INTRODUCTION
Commonly used definitions of "project financing" are fo-
cused on the productive capabilities of an economic unit (i.e.,
the project) and the needs and preferences of the debt partici-
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pants in financing the construction and operation of such units,
with the impact on the equity participants being implied by the
debt structure. In general terms, a "project financing" is the fi-
nancing of an economic unit in which the lenders look initially
to the cash flows from operation of that economic unit for repay-
ment of the project loan and to those cash flows and the other
assets comprising the economic unit as collateral for the loan. It
is an "off-balance sheet" method of financing from the vantage
of the operator of the project.
Project financing techniques have become a primary means
for financing a broad range of economic units throughout the
world. The application of these techniques has been refined in
most industrial categories and with respect to most types of as-
sets. For example, they are used for the financing of power gen-
eration, transmission, and distribution assets; for upstream, mid-
stream, and downstream assets in the oil and gas industries; for
petrochemical, paper, and mining projects; and for the entire
panoply of infrastructure projects, including roads, airports, and
desalination plants. These techniques have been used for the
financing of tankers and other vessels, aircraft, and virtually
every type of manufacturing, transportation, computer, and tele-
communications equipment.
And, with one major exception, project financing tech-
niques have been used in most countries and economic systems
in the world. The one major exception is that relatively little
implementation has been made of those techniques in transac-
tions that are compliant with the precepts of Islamic Shari'ah, be
it in Islamic jurisdictions such as the Middle East, North Africa,
Malaysia, Indonesia, or in other jurisdictions. A significant limit-
ing factor relates to the conflict of certain Islamic principles with
the fundamental debt-leverage principle of Western project fi-
nancing, namely Islamic Shari'ah prohibitions on the payment or
receipt of interest and other aspects of the doctrine of iba.2
2. Riba is traditionally translated as usury. However, jurists have a more expansive
concept in Islamic jurisprudence, addressing not only prevention of the exploitation of
those in a weak bargaining position, but also "the illegality of all forms of gain or profit
which were unearned in the sense that they resulted from speculative or risky transac-
tions and could not be precisely calculated in advance by the contracting parties."
NOELJ. COULSON, COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE GULF STATES: THE ISLAMIC LEGAL TRADITION
11 (1984) [hereinafter COULSON, GULF STATES COMMERCIAL LAW]. See FRANK E. VOGEL
& SAMUEL L. HAYES, III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK AND RETURN 71-95
(1998) [hereinafter VOGEL & HAYES]; NABIL A. SALEH, UNLAWFUL GAIN AND LEGITIMATE
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The essential participants in any financing of a large scale
industrial, infrastructure, real estate, or similar project are (a)
one or more equity investors (often the sponsors of the project)
and (b) the availability of debt financing or an Islamically ac-
ceptable alternative to the debt portion of the financing.3 The
determination by a bank or other financier as to whether to par-
ticipate in a given project financing of this type centers on the
project economics and, particularly, in a limited recourse project
financings, the collateral package that is made available to se-
cure the financing. Project sponsors and their affiliates have a
strong aversion to guaranteeing a project loan or other financ-
ing and to otherwise incurring a balance sheet liability in respect
of a project. This is particularly true of companies that may have
to reflect the guarantee liability on, or consolidate project debt
onto, a parent company balance sheet under generally accepted
accounting principles. Thus, in addition to careful tax and own-
ership structuring, project sponsors and their parent companies
also have a strong interest in providing the financiers with an
acceptable collateral security package. And, to effectuate liabil-
ity limitations and non-consolidation, sponsors and their parent
companies want the collateral for the project to be, and to be
limited to, the assets comprising the project and the cash flows
from operation of the project.
This highlights a second group of limitations on the imple-
mentation of project financing techniques in transactions that
are Shari'ah-compliant: the difficulty of obtaining a collateral se-
curity interest under the Shari'ah and the constraints inherent in
the nature of a rahn (mortgage/pledge) under the Shari'ah.
PROFIT IN ISLAMIC LAw 11-43 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter SALEH]; NAYLA COMAIR-OBEID,
THE LAW OF BUSINESS CONTRACTS IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST 43-57 (1996); Mahmoud A.
El-Gamal, An Economic Explication of the Prohibitions of Riba in Classical Islamic Jurispru-
dence, in THIRD HARVARD ISLAMIC FORUM, supra note 1, at 29-40. See generally J.T. Noo-
NAN, SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY (1957) (providing an interesting perspective on the
Islamic concept of riba and a good history of usury in medieval Europe, including Ca-
non Law positions at different periods).
See also Don Babai, Islamic Project Finance: Problems and Promises, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE SECOND HARVARD UNIVERSITY FORUM ON ISLAMIC FINANCE: ISLAMIC FINANCE INTO
THE 21ST CENTURY (1999) [hereinafter SECOND HARVARD ISLAMIC FORUM] (noting other
limitations); THIRD HARVARD ISLAMIC FORUM, supra note 1.
3. Two of the case studies set forth in this Essay describe such alternatives: the
sharikat mahassa-murabaha structure used for the Utility Power Project and described in
Section VI and the istisna'a-ijara structure used for the Maconda Park and Truman Park
Projects and described in Section VII.
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There is a pressing need for industrial, infrastructure, and
real estate development in the entire range of Islamic jurisdic-
tions. And, as noted below, there is a significant trend in Islamic
jurisdictions to broaden the capital base within each country,
draw upon funds from a world-wide financing base, and reduce
reliance on local capital for all financing needs. However, there
is a dearth of available financing structures that bridge Western
financial systems4 and Islamic systems. And there is a perception
that the legal systems and principles of the Western systems and
the Islamic systems are so diverse as to be unbridgeable.
This Essay focuses on two aspects of project financings in an
Islamic jurisdiction: (i) the design and implementation of a col-
lateral security structure under Islamic Shari'ah precepts and (ii)
the design and implementation of Shari'ah-compliant financing
structures so as to avoid, among other things, prohibitions on
the payment and receipt of interest, and so as to comply with
Shari'ah precepts applicable to the specific contractual arrange-
ments used in those financings.5
To give structure to the discussion, four case studies are
presented. Two of the case studies are of projects in Saudi Ara-
bia, and the other two are of a Shari'ah-compliant structure re-
cently implemented in the United States. The Saudi Arabian
transactions were chosen (i) because of they were the first of
their kind, (ii) because they involved both Western and Middle
Eastern sources of financing (and thus had to comply with credit
.policies and legal requirements applicable in multiple divergent
jurisdictions), and (iii) because of the lack of an applicable statu-
tory framework in The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which forced
direct consideration of Shari'ah principles and precepts. The
United States transactions were chosen because they also were
4. References to "Western" systems are primarily to financing techniques and ex-
pectations that predominate in the United States of America, Europe, and Japan.
5. In addition to sources cited in this Essay (and other sources), many Islamic
scholars, Islamic financiers, and Saudi Arabian legal practitioners have graciously pro-
vided invaluable assistance to the author in orally exploring Shari'ah principles and
precepts, including those applicable to the structures discussed in this Essay. The au-
thor expresses particular gratitude to Dr. Mohamed Mi Elgari of the National Manage-
ment Consultancy Center and of King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
Mr. Hafedh Maamouri, currently Senior Consultant with Islamic Finance Consultants in
Manama, Bahrain, and previously Head of Islamic Banking for Saudi American Bank,
and Hassan M.S. Mahassni, Esq. of the Law Office of Hassan Mahassni in association
with White & Case LLP. Any errors in the statements of Shari'ah principles and
precepts are the sole responsibility of the author.
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the first of their kind and because they illustrates application of
Islamic financings in a more complex regulatory environment
without diminution in Islamic compliance or the ability to apply
the structure in other jurisdictions.
An Islamically acceptable collateral security structure is dis-
cussed in the context of a case study for the first limited recourse
project financing in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Chevron pe-
trochemical project in late 1998. In particular, it focuses on the
development of the rahn-adl structure for that financing. This
collateral security structure has been used as a model for, and
has found a much broader implementation in, other secured
financings throughout the Middle East. The first Shai'ah-com-
pliant financing structure discussed in this Essay is a sharikat
mahassa-murabaha (joint venture-share sale) structure that was
used in the project financing of the expansion of a power plant
and related transmission facilities in Saudi Arabia for an electric
utility ("Utility") in 1998. The second Shari'ah-compliant financ-
ing structure was implemented (a) first in Austin, Texas, in June
2000, for the Maconda Park Apartments project and (b) second
in Largo, Maryland, in April 2001, for the Truman Park Apart-
ments project. Both the Maconda Park Project and the Truman
Park Project (collectively, the "Projects") entail construction fi-
nancing for residential housing developments. The Truman
Park Project involved the take-out of a conventional construction
loan using an Islamic structure. The Islamic structure in both
transactions is an istisna'a-ijara (construction contract-lease)
structure that involves bank construction and ownership of the
project with a subsequent financing lease to the involved project
company.
I. SOURCES OF ISLAMIC SHARIAH
Islamic religious law as applied to commercial activities is
comprised, for purposes of this Essay, of two parts: Shari'ah (lit-
erally, "the Way"), or perfect, immutable, divine law, as revealed
in the Qur'an and the sunna; and fiqh (literally, "understand-
ing"), or the sum of human comprehension of that divine law.
While there is dispute among Islamic scholars as to the precise
manner in which Islamic law is to be determined, those who de-
termine Islamic law are religious scholars (ulama) that are
skilled in interpreting the revealed sources of the Shari'ah and
11892001]
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the fiqh and in financial and economic disciplines. The primary
methodology used in this determinative and interpretive effort is
ijtihad (literally, "effort"), or legal reasoning. Ijtihad observes a
particular methodology, called the "roots of the law" (usual al-
fiqh).6 The roots (usul) upon which Islamic jurisprudence is
based are (a) the Qur'an, being the holy book of Islam, (b) the
sunna of the Prophet Mohammed, which are the binding au-
thority of his dicta and decisions, (c) the ijma or "consensus" of
the community of scholars, and (d) the qiyas, or analogical de-
ductions and reasoning.
In practice, Islamic Shari'ah is determined by ulama, acting
individually or in groups. For purposes of this Essay, it is impor-
tant to note that most significant Islamic financial institutions
have Shari'ah supervisory boards, committees, and advisors
("Shari'ah Boards"), comprised of one or more Islamic scholars
that have particular expertise in economic and financial transac-
tions. These Shari'ah Boards will often examine in detail both
the structure of a proposed transaction or financial product and
the documentation giving effect to that transaction or product.
In the course of structuring the transaction and documentation,
there may well be multiple review sessions by the Shari'ah Board
with modifications to the structure and the documentation after
each review session, a process of continual refinement to give
effect to the determinations of the Shari'ah Board with respect to
the individual transaction or product. Given that Shari'ah Board
determinations are fiqh (human comprehension of Shari'ah, the
divine law), there can be variations in interpretation and imple-
mentation from one Shari'ah Board to another, with a multiplic-
ity of views on a specific issue. These variations occur even
though Shari'ah scholars in this period strive to achieve a consen-
sus on difficult and novel issues, such as those involved in the
development of new financial instruments and products.7 Is-
6. See generally NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (1964); JOSEPH
SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCrION TO ISLAMIC LAW (1964). See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2;
NICHOLAS DYLAN RAY, ARAB ISLAMIC BANKING AND THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW (1995)
[hereinafter RAY]; SALEH, supra note 2; COULSON, GULF STATES COMMERCIAL LAW, supra
note 2; see also SECOND HARVARD ISLAMIC FORUM, supra note 2; THIRD HARVARD ISLAMIC
FORUM, supra note 1 (containing articles covering current issues in Islamic finance).
While, as a precise matter, all discussion of Islamic jurisprudence is one offiqh, this
Essay, in keeping with convention, will refer to precepts and principles of Shari'ah with-
out further reference to fiqh.
7. See Nizam Yaquby, Islamic Finance in View of the Shari'ah, in SECOND HARVARD
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lamic investors, be they financial institutions or individual inves-
tors, rely heavily on the involvement of Shari'ah Boards in the
structuring and documentation of a transaction or financial
product and may request that the Shari'ah Board's fatwa of ap-
proval be provided before an investment is made.
II. THE ECONOMIC AMD FINANCING ENVIRONMENT IN
SAUDI ARABIA
The economic and financing environment in Saudi Arabia
prior to, and at the time of consummation of, the financings of
the Saudi Chevron petrochemical project and the Utility power
project (the first two case studies) involved a focus on diversifica-
tion of the industrial base in the Kingdom. There was a trend
toward accessing a broader financing base, with greater involve-
ment of Saudi Arabian investors as well as foreign investors, in-
ternationalization of the financing process, and the use of pro-
ject financing techniques rather than personal and corporate
guarantees. Concurrently, the government and local businesses
were considering and attempting to implement methods of re-
ducing the role of government in the provision of financing.
In the initial stages, industrial diversification proceeded
most rapidly in the petrochemicals industry, particularly where
affiliates of Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation
("SABIC") were involved. Among the early petrochemical
projects that obtained financing were expansions by Saudi
Yanbu Petrochemical Company ("Yanpet"), a joint venture be-
tween SABIC and Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Company, Saudi
Petrochemical Company ("Sadaf"), UnitedJubail Fertilizer Com-
pany, a joint venture among SABIC and five SABIC companies,
A1-Jubail Petrochemical Company ("Kemya"), and Eastern Pe-
trochemical Company ("Sharq"). Notably, 1998 also saw the first
international lending transaction in the electricity sector when
Saudi Consolidated Electric Company in the Eastern Province
executed a "dedicated receivables" financing for its Ghazlan II
power project near Yanbu.
Financings by these, and other, companies involved some
degree of recourse to the project sponsors or their affiliates.
They also involved some element of collateral security for the
IsLAMIc FORUM, supra note 2, at 159-61 (summarizing these and other responsibilities of
modern Shari'ah Boards).
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financiers of such projects. However, these projects did not fall
within the "limited recourse project financing" concept that is
being considered in this Essay and none of those projects in-
volved the use of the rahn-adl collateral security, sharikat mahassa-
murabaha, or istisna'a-ijara structures discussed in this Essay.
These early projects illustrate a broader involvement of
Saudi Arabian investors. Each project involved significant or ex-
clusively Saudi Arabian equity, and some involved joint stock
companies that may eventually seek stock exchange listings. For-
eign investors, such as Chevron, were allowed to participate in
company ownership in Saudi Arabia, and there has been a signif-
icant advance in the encouragement of foreign investment in
Saudi Arabia since the Saudi Chevron financing. In addition,
Saudi Chevron and many SABIC projects, such as Yanpet, in-
volve a combination of local, regional, and international lenders.
The health and liquidity of local and regional banks were
significant factors in industrial and infrastructure finance in
Saudi Arabia in that period. Local banks reported profits in
each of the years preceding the financings of the Saudi Chevron
petrochemical and Utility power projects. Those banks exper-
ienced substantial liquidity and low loan-to-asset ratios. Profits
were based more on investment income than interest, and loan
growth had been low. This encouraged banks to increase lend-
ing to all economic sectors. To spread risks and increase the
borrowing base, banks sought to join regional and international
lending groups, particularly for large projects such as Saudi
Chevron, Ghazlan II, and Yanpet.
Governmental evaluations were ongoing regarding restruc-
turing of the electricity sector, with initial consideration given to
financing the Shoaiba project as an independent power project
using a build-own-operate ("BOO") structure.' Privatization of
the telecommunications sector, Saudi Arabian Airlines, and port
operations, maintenance, and management were all being ac-
tively considered, and the privatization of the telecommunica-
tions sector did proceed. A public offering of SABIC shares was
also being considered at the time. Regarding capital markets de-
velopment, in April 1998, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
("SAMA") issued a new binding draft of the Investment Business
8. The transaction Was not completed as a build-own-operate structure at that
time. Restructuring of the electricity system was undertaken and is in process.
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Regulations, which regulate, among other things, the distribu-
tion of securities and the management of mutual funds. Acces-
sion to the World Trade Organization was also a frequently con-
sidered topic, together with its effects on brokerage, insurance,
and commercial banking activities, as well as export/import mar-
kets.
Each of these developments, and others, worked to expand
the capital markets, permitting greater access to foreign funds
and a strengthening of the economy over the longer term. One
goal was to free up Saudi Arabian capital, allowing it be spread
over a broader risk base within the economy. It was believed that
this, in turn, would have the effect of a reduced burden on gov-
ernment and an allocation of risks to those willing and most able
to bear them. It was anticipated that increased foreign equity
investment would result in further technology transfer into the
industrial and infrastructure sectors. As completed financings il-
lustrate, the time frame for implementation of individual
projects was reduced as businessmen sought to avoid additional
costs of delays and other inefficiencies in implementing their
projects. Privatization, where determined appropriate, would al-
low governmental risk sharing with the private sector, cost reduc-
tion, and governmental management of the pace and depth of
movement of functions to the private sector.
III. THE SAUDI ARABIAN LEGAL ENVIRONMENT:
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The fundamental and paramount body of law in The King-
dom of Saudi Arabia is the Shari'ah, as construed by the Hanbali
School of Islamic jurisprudence.9 The sources of the Shari'ah
9. The four major schools of Islamic jurisprudence are: (1) the Hanafi School,
which is predominant in the countries of the former Ottoman Empire and emanated
from the disciples of Abu Hanafi (d. 767 H.) in the Iraqi center of Kufa; (2) the Hanbali
School, which is predominant in The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and few other jurisdic-
tions and was formed aby Ahmad bin Hangal (d. 855 H.); (3) the Maliki School, which
emanated from the Arabian center in Medina through the followers of Malik bin Anas
(d. 796 H.); and (4) the Shafi'i School formed by the followers of Shafi'i (d. 820 H.).
The four major schools differ in many respects in their interpretation of certain
Shari'ah precepts. Most scholars from medieval times until modern times aligned them-
selves with one of the four major schools of Islamic jurisprudence. However, in modern
times many scholars do not believe it necessary to belong to any single school of Islamic
jurisprudence. See VOGEL & HAYEs, supra note 2, at 34-41 (describing methods of elabo-
ration of law).
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are the Qur'an, the sunna, ijma, and the qiyas. Certain matters
are dealt with "statutorily," by Royal Decrees with respect to that
matter. Where such a statutory body of law has been promul-
gated, such law is ultimately subject to, and may not conflict
with, the provisions of the Shari'ah. Unlike other Middle Eastern
countries, there is no statutory body of law in Saudi Arabia with
respect to collateral security, mortgages and pledges, recorda-
tion of security interests, or related matters.1 ° Nor is there a
comprehensive statutory regime pertaining to sale (istisna'a) or
lease (ijara) transactions. There are statutes pertaining to joint
ventures and other types of business organizations and foreign
investments in Saudi Arabia. However, considerations, hereinaf-
ter set forth below in this Section III, limit the predictability of
those statutes in certain circumstances. Thus, financiers and le-
gal practitioners must look directly to the Shari'ah in structuring
and applying legal principles relating to collateral security mat-
ters, sales transactions, and leases. Financiers and legal practi-
tioners must also look to the Shari'ah in implementing existing
statutory provisions. These factors, in addition to those dis-
cussed immediately below, render it difficult to provide defini-
tive advice as to how collateral security and financing arrange-
ments similar to those implemented in the Saudi Chevron, Util-
ity Power, Maconda Park, and Truman Park transactions can be
effected or would be interpreted by adjudicative bodies in Saudi
Arabia.1 It is noteworthy, however, that under the Shari'ah, ab-
sent a prohibition in the Shari'ah, the agreement of the parties
will control.
In addition, under the principles of law applicable in Saudi
Arabia, previous decisions of Saudi Arabian courts and other ad-
judicative authorities are not considered to establish binding
precedents for the decision of later cases, and the principle of
stare decisis is not accepted in Saudi Arabia. Also, Royal Decrees,
10. A unique exception in Saudi Arabia is in the area of ship mortgages, which is
governed by the Commercial Court Regulations (Royal Decree No. M27 of 1931), the
Ship Mortgage Regulations (which came into force on June 17, 1955), and the Regula-
tions for Ports and Harbors (Royal Decree No. M27 of July 14, 1974), the Regulations
for Ports, Harbors and Lighthouses dated 19/6/1394 (Resolution No. 934 of the Coun-
cil of Ministers).
11. This realization had a profound impact on the "scientific method" and ap-
proach chosen for development of the rahn-adl collateral security structure. Predict-
ability of outcome was a primary concern of the financing banks in the Saudi Chevron
transaction.
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ministerial decisions and resolutions, departmental circulars and
other governmental pronouncements having the force of law,
and the decisions of the various courts and adjudicatory authori-
ties of Saudi Arabia are not generally or consistently collected in
a central place and are not necessarily available to the public.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA
A. Jurisdiction of Enforcement Entities
Considerations of choice of forum are critical in every fi-
nancing and in every jurisdiction in the world. Different en-
forcement entities have different areas of expertise and different
sensitivities to issues. Each enforcement entity has a different
array of remedies that it can apply, particularly in a jurisdiction
such as Saudi Arabia. Rights to appeal from each enforcement
entity are different as are the procedural rules applicable to each
enforcement entity. And, given varying dockets and procedures,
the dispute resolution period can and does vary dramatically
from one enforcement entity to another.
There are a number of different courts, committees, offices,
and boards (collectively, "Enforcement Entities") that might
have jurisdiction over a matter in Saudi Arabia in which a bank
could be involved. Three of these Enforcement Entities were of
particular relevance in the context of the financings of the Saudi
Chevron Project and the Utility Power Project: the Banking Dis-
putes Settlement Committee ("SAMA Committee") of the Saudi
Arabian Monetary Agency ("SAMA"); the Office of the Settle-
ment of Negotiable Instruments Disputes, also known as the Ne-
gotiable Instruments Offices ("NIO"), which are under the juris-
diction of the Ministry of Commerce;12 and the Board of Griev-
ances (Qiwan Al-Mazal'im) under The Board of Grievances Law
("Board of Grievances"). In summary:
(i) The SAMA Committee has jurisdiction over matters and
disputes involving banks and their customers-that is,
"settling" (mediating) disputes between banks and their
customers "in accordance with the agreements con-
cluded between them." Under the regulations constitut-
ing the SAMA Committee, all disputes between banks,
12. The NIO operates in practice like a court with hearings being held in a num-
ber of different circuit locations in Saudi Arabia. For ease of reference, references to
the NIO will be in the singular.
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including foreign banks, and their customers (other
than those involving negotiable instruments) are to be
referred in the first instance to the SAMA Committee. 3
(ii) The NIO has jurisdiction over actions, matters, and dis-
putes involving negotiable instruments (such as the
promissory notes used in the financings discussed in this
Essay), and in the context of such disputes, the NIO has
jurisdiction superior to that of the SAMA Committee.' 4
(iii) The Board of Grievances has jurisdiction over commer-
cial disputes (by implication, other than banking dis-
putes and negotiable instruments disputes), including
the enforcement of foreign judgments and bankruptcy
matters.15
The jurisdiction of the various Enforcement Entities is, in
certain respects, unclear and arguably overlapping. Numerous
questions arise as to which Enforcement Entity would have juris-
diction in various matters involving one of the financing banks
in the transactions discussed in this Essay. For example, al-
though the Board of Grievances has jurisdiction with respect to
enforcement of foreign judgments and awards generally, the
SAMA Committee has jurisdiction with respect to all matters in-
volving banks (other than in respect of negotiable instruments).
Does this mean that the SAMA Committee should assertjurisdic-
tion with respect to a foreign award obtained by a bank? Would
this be true despite the express provisions of the various official
pronouncements regarding enforcement of foreign awards, par-
ticularly those rendered in foreign arbitrations? In the bank-
ruptcy context, although the Board of Grievances generally has
jurisdiction, if a bank creditor has a claim, should the SAMA
Committee take jurisdiction? Which Enforcement Entity has ju-
risdiction where the foreign judgment or award obtained by a
bank is on a negotiable instrument? These are questions of first
instance in Saudi Arabia that will be determined by each En-
forcement Entity, and it is not possible to determine in advance
the decision that will be made.
Given the foregoing situation and issues, among others, it
13. SAMA Committee decisions are final and not appealable.
14. NIO judgments may be appealed to the Legal Committee of the Ministry of
Commerce.
15. Determinations of the Board of Grievances may be appealed to the Board of
Grievances Scrutinization Committee.
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was important to structure the Saudi Arabian transactions in a
manner that would afford the banks initial access to, and an ulti-
mate determination by, the Enforcement Entity of their choice
in any given situation and the opportunity to raise these jurisdic-
tional issues with the chosen Enforcement Entity.
B. Examination of Underlying Documentation Under the Shari'ah
Creditors involved in disputes to be resolved through the
SAMA Committee or the NIO are afforded certain advantages
over creditors who pursue their claims before the Board of
Grievances. Although the SAMA Committee is in theory obliged
to apply the Shari'ah and its precepts, including the prohibition
on interest, to banking disputes, in practice the SAMA Commit-
tee has generally shown a willingness to force a recalcitrant
debtor to honor the terms of the agreement creating the indebt-
edness, regardless of whether the agreement requires the pay-
ment of monies in the nature of interest or is otherwise variant
from principles of Saudi Arabian law. The SAMA Committee
does examine the various underlying documents and will make
inquiry as to whether these arrangements are in accordance with
Saudi Arabian law, but it makes all reasonable efforts to respect
the agreement of the parties even in the face of conflicts with
the Shari'ah.
It is noteworthy that review by the SAMA Committee is com-
prised of a legal review and an accounting review. The account-
ants of the SAMA Committee perform independent determina-
tions based on their calculations of the amount of interest paya-
ble in respect of a given dispute. Interest is payable only to the
date of commencement of the action with the SAMA Commit-
tee. Thus, no interest is payable in respect of periods after such
date and no interest is payable in respect of overdue amounts. It
is the author's understanding based upon discussions with Saudi
Arabian lawyers and judges that in practice most actions before
the SAMA Committee take from six months to one year.
Remedies available to the SAMA Committee include (i) pro-
hibition of the debtor from leaving Saudi Arabia and (ii) putting
the debtor on a "notice list" that is circulated to banks in Saudi
Arabia. The second alternative can be a very effective remedy, as
banks in Saudi Arabia will decline to conduct banking business
with the debtor so listed.
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Where the SAMA Committee, acting as a mediation body, is
unable to bring about a settlement of a dispute, its implement-
ing regulations require that the matter be submitted to the court
of competent jurisdiction (i.e., the Board of Grievances) for a de
novo hearing. Notwithstanding the express requirements of such
implementing regulations, however, under present practice the
Board of Grievances will generally decline to hear cases that fall
under the jurisdiction of the SAMA Committee. 16
In resolving actions, matters, and disputes within its jurisdic-
tion, the NIO will generally enforce a debt obligation as evi-
denced by a negotiable instrument without looking to the sub-
stance of the transaction giving rise to such instrument, includ-
ing whether such indebtedness includes amounts in the nature
of interest.17 The NIO will, however, consider general defenses
such as whether or not a debt was actually incurred or a negotia-
ble instrument properly formed. Thus, the NIO generally does
not undertake an inquiry into whether the documents underly-
ing a negotiable instrument comply with the Shari'ah and certain
other principles of Saudi Arabian law.is Saudi Arabian legal
practitioners have informed the author that actions before the
NIO are resolved in less time that those before the SAMA Com-
mittee.
The Board of Grievances will undertake a fulsome examina-
tion of any matter presented to it, and this examination will in-
clude a rigorous inquiry into matters of public policy (including
the compliance of all documentation with the Shari'ah and other
principles of Saudi Arabian law). Thus, if a foreign judgment or
award is obtained and enforcement is sought in Saudi Arabia,
the Board of Grievances may examine the underlying documen-
tation and make what is essentially a de novo determination as to
whether the documentation underlying the judgment complies
16. The author has been informed that the Minister of the Interior has instructed
the Civil Rights Department, the department of the Ministry of the Interior that is re-
sponsible for enforcing judgments of the SAMA Committee, that decisions of the SAMA
Committee are to be enforced in the same manner as a decision of a court.
17. Many transactions are thus structured to provide separate notes for principal,
interest, and other costs and expenses. These transactions frequently have a require-
ment for on-going provision of such notes.
18. Ajudgment issued by the NIO may be enforced through a presentation of the
judgment to the Civil Rights Department of the Ministry of the Interior. Saudi Arabian
legal practitioners have indicated that, unfortunately, the Civil Rights Department is
often somewhat less than diligent in enforcing judgments.
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with the Shari'ah and other Saudi Arabian law. In the context of
considering the position of the Board of Grievances, it should be
noted that the Board of Grievances generally does not recognize
provisions of agreements with respect to choice of foreign law or
submission to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. Actions before
the Board of Grievances often take from two to ten years, al-
though the author has been informed by Saudi Arabian legal
practitioners that actions for enforcement of foreign judgments
are likely to take approximately one year if the order or award,
on its face, does not contravene the Shari'ah or Saudi Arabian
law.
C. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Awards; Arbitration
As noted above, large industrial, infrastructure, real estate,
and other projects are increasingly international in scope. Thus,
they frequently involve the law of two or more countries. A criti-
cal set of legal and financial issues involve the enforcement of a
foreign (e.g., American, English, or French) arbitral award or
court judgment against the project company or its assets in the
country in which the project is located (in this case, Saudi Ara-
bia). The court with jurisdiction over applications seeking en-
forcement of foreign judgments is the Board of Grievances.
There is an unresolved jurisdictional issue where the foreign
judgment or arbitral award is obtained by a bank because of the
jurisdiction of the SAMA Committee over disputes involving
banks. The author is aware of only one case where a foreign
bank has sought to enforce in Saudi Arabia a decision of a for-
eign court or arbitral body.19
There is little precedent for the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments by the Saudi Arabian courts.2 1 In-
19. It is likely that, on the basis of Council of Ministers Resolution No. 729/8
(which establishes the jurisdiction of the Board of Grievances to enforce foreign
awards) and the animosity with which many Board of Grievances judges view non-Is-
lamic banks, the Board of Grievances will refuse to exercise jurisdiction over the en-
forcement application submitted by a non-Islamic commercial bank. On the other
hand, the Board of Grievances might decide that it is inappropriate for a decision of a
foreign arbitral body or court to be referred to a non-judicial body (such as the SAMA
Committee) for enforcement, particularly where jurisdiction over enforcement actions
is specifically given to the Board of Grievances.
20. See A. Kritzalis, Saudi Arabia, in INTERNATIONAL EXECUTION AGAINST JUDGMENT
DEBTORS (D. Campbell ed., 1993) (providing a comprehensive analysis of issues arising
in respect of enforcement actions).
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deed, other than a small number of 1989 cases involving judg-
ments of courts in member states of the Arab League, the author
is aware of no instance where the Board of Grievances has af-
forded final recognition to, and enforced, a judgment of a for-
eign court or a foreign arbitral award. The author has been in-
formed of a single recent case in which a bank sought enforce-
ment of a foreign judgment or award.2 ' In that case, the Board
of Grievances reportedly declined to exercise jurisdiction be-
cause of the involvement of a bank. Presumably, enforcement
would be sought from the SAMA Committee in such an in-
stance.
22
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabian law does give the Board of
Grievances the power to issue a judgment recognizing a foreign
judgment for enforcement in Saudi Arabia if the state of origin
would afford reciprocal recognition to the judgments of the
Saudi Arabian courts and provided that nothing in the foreign
judgment contravenes the Shari'ah.23 In the only recent cases of
which the author is aware that sought enforcement of decisions
of the courts of England, the Board of Grievances declined to
enforce the judgments because no showing had been made that
the English courts would afford reciprocal treatment to a Saudi
Arabian court decision. 24 As noted above, the Board of Griev-
ances is said to have recently declined to exercise jurisdiction in
21. The author is unaware of whether this is a foreign courtjudgment or a foreign
arbitral award.
22. The author has been unable to determine at this time whether the party seek-
ing enforcement of the foreign award has sought enforcement by the SAMA Committee
in the referenced case.
23. Rules of Civil Procedure Before the Board of Grievances, Council of Ministers
Resolution No. 190 dated 16/11/1409 A.H. (June 20, 1989), Article 6. Additional re-
quirements for the enforcement of foreign judicial awards are set forth in Circular
Number 7 of the President of the Board of Grievances, 15/8/1409 A.H. (May 5, 1985).
24. In these companion cases, the Board of Grievances initially issued a decision
recognizing the three English High Court decisions. On appeal, however, the Board of
Grievances found that there was no treaty between Saudi Arabia and the United King-
dom allowing for the reciprocal enforcement ofjudgments and that, on the evidence
submitted, no law of the United Kingdom would provide for automatic recognition of a
Saudi Arabian judgment. Rather, the Board of Grievances concluded that a judgment
creditor seeking to enforce a Saudi Arabian court judgment in England would have to
commence a common law action against the English judgment debtor in the English
High Court to recover the debt evidenced by the Saudi Arabian judgment. In such new
action, the English High Court could accept the Saudi Arabian judgment as proof of
the debt. The Board of Grievances, therefore, held that the enforcement of the three
High Court judgments should be denied.
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the case of a foreign court judgment or arbitral award obtained
by a bank.
In 1994, Saudi Arabia filed an instrument of accession to
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Arbitral Awards of 1958 ("New York Convention"). The au-
thorizing decree incorporates the requisite reciprocity require-
ment and specifies that jurisdiction over actions seeking enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards shall lie with the Board of Griev-
ances.
2 5
To date, the Board of Grievances has not issued procedural
rules for actions seeking enforcement of international arbitra-
tion awards. The author understands from Saudi Arabian legal
practitioners who have consulted Board of Grievances officials
that no such rules will be issued in the near future. This being
the case, it appears that an application for the recognition of a
foreign arbitral award would be submitted and would proceed in
accordance with the procedures specified for applications in re-
spect of the recognition of foreign judicial awards.
The author also understands that only one application seek-
ing recognition of a foreign arbitral award under the New York
Convention has been filed to date. In that case, the Board of
Grievances declined to exercise jurisdiction because a bank ob-
tained the foreign court judgment or award. Presumably, the
bank must then make application to the SAMA Committee for
enforcement of the judgment or award. Since any such applica-
tion to the Board of Grievances would be quite rare at this point
in time, it would be reasonable to anticipate that the Board of
Grievances would consider such an application, as well as any
objections filed with respect to the application, carefully and de-
liberately. De novo Board of Grievances proceedings normally
last from two to ten years, with the long duration being in large
25. The structure for the Saudi Chevron transaction was designed to allow the
banks, through the Onshore Security Agent, to attempt to enforce the foreign award
through the SAMA Committee, rather than through the Board of Grievances. The
structure of the Utility power project transaction was similarly structured. In each case,
this should result in (i) substantially quicker resolution and enforcement and (ii) avoid-
ance of a de novo review of the underlying documentation by the Board of Grievances in
the enforcement action.
The respective jurisdictional ambits of the SAMA Committee and the Board of
Grievances in this situation are unclear and, to the author's knowledge, except as noted
in the text, no actions have been brought by a bank in either forum for enforcement of
a foreign arbitral or judicial award to date.
120120011
1202 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:1184
part due to Shari'ah rules of procedure that allow a defendant
considerable ability to delay the final resolution of the proceed-
ing. The author understands from Saudi Arabian legal practi-
tioners that a proceeding before the Board of Grievances to en-
force an arbitral award, which on its face does not contravene
the Shari'ah or other Saudi Arabian law, should take approxi-
mately one year.
However, officials of the Board of Grievances have also indi-
cated that they will review arbitral awards brought for enforce-
ment under the New York Convention to ensure compliance
with the Shari'ah on public policy grounds. Although it is clear
that decisions that are contrary to the Shari'ah will not be en-
forced on public policy grounds, it is unclear how broadly the
Board of Grievances will review an award or the legal basis for
the issuance of the award to ensure compliance with the
Shari'ah. For example, it is possible that the Board of Grievances
would decline to recognize an award if it is based upon underly-
ing contractual commitments that would not be enforceable
under the Shari'ah, such as where the underlying contractual
commitment is prohibited, or muharam, under Islamic jurispru-
dence. Similarly, it is also possible that the Board of Grievances
would decline to recognize an award of damages where the dam-
ages are of a type that would not be available under the
Shari'ah2 6 or where an element of an award would not be availa-
ble under the Shari'ah. For example, generally speaking, in judi-
cial proceedings in Saudi Arabia, the courts will only award ac-
tual, proven, out-of-pocket damages. Damages that are deemed
by Saudi Arabian jurists to be speculative in nature, such as lost
profits, are generally not available under the Shari'ah as inter-
preted in Saudi Arabia. Recognition of an award containing an
element deemed to be speculative may therefore be declined.
From conversations with Saudi Arabian jurists, it is the au-
thor's understanding that the wording of the judgment or award
may be critical. Many jurists believe that the Board of Griev-
ances will not look beyond the face of the award, particularly in
26. Perhaps the clearest example of an element of an award that would be contrary
to the Shari'ah would be where it contains an element of interest. Interest is considered
to be a form of unearned gain, or riba, which is prohibited under the Shari'ah as con-
strued in Saudi Arabia. The Board of Grievances will decline to enforce that part of any
foreign award that constitutes an award of interest or amounts in the nature of interest.
No pre-judgment interest on damages suffered is therefore recoverable.
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the case of an arbitral award. If the award, on its face, does not
contravene the Shari'ah or other Saudi Arabian law, it is felt that
the Board of Grievances will not look beyond the award to sub-
stantive documentary provisions, although it will examine juris-
dictional matters.
The fact that a foreign judicial decision contains an element
that violates the Shari'ah may not necessarily be fatal to the en-
forcement of the decision, however. For example, the party
seeking recognition of the decision in Saudi Arabia could, as a
part of its recognition application, expressly disclaim any right to
recovery based upon the contravening element. For example,
the party could disclaim any right to recover the interest compo-
nent of the award. Furthermore, in the event that the recogni-
tion of an English arbitral award or judicial decision in Saudi
Arabia is the only means by which the financing banks could
obtain satisfaction with respect to claims under the applicable
loan or other financing agreement, it might be possible to fash-
ion the claims, and thus hopefully the decision, in such a way as
to maximize the probability of the decision being recognized by
the Board of Grievances.
V. COLLATERAL SECURITY: THE SAUDI CHEVRON
RAHN-ADL STRUCTURE
A. Participants and General Structure
The Saudi Chevron petrochemical project is a benzene and
cyclohexane project located in Madinat Al-Jubail AI-Sinaiyah,
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The project company, which
owns and operates the project, is Saudi Chevron Petrochemical
Company, a Saudi Arabian limited liability company ("SC Pro-
ject Company"). Equity in the SC Project Company is held by a
Chevron Corporation affiliate ("Chevron") and Saudi Industrial
Venture Capital Group ("SIVCG"). Loans for the project were
made to the SC Project Company by a syndicated group of inter-
national, regional, and local banks ("SC Banks") led by Chase
Investment Bank Limited, Gulf International Bank B.S.C., The
Industrial Bank of Japan, Limited, United Saudi Bank, and The
Saudi Investment Bank, as Arrangers. Additional loans, not gov-
erned by the agreements discussed in this Essay, were made to
the SC Project Company by Saudi Industrial Development Fund
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("SIDF") .27
In summary, construction and long-term multi-tranche
loans are made by the SC Banks to the SC Project Company pur-
suant to a Facilities Agreement ("SC Facilities Agreement") and
certain related documents and are evidenced by promissory
notes ("SC Notes") (collectively, " SC Financing Agreements").
Such loans are secured by essentially all the cash flows from the
operation of the project, all the assets comprising the project,28
and all assets owned or held by the SC Project Company pursu-
ant to a mortgage (rahn) ("SC Mortgage (Rahn)") and numer-
ous pledge (rahn) and assignment agreements ("SC Pledge
(Rahn) Agreements") (collectively, "SC Security Documents").
The primary categories of assets of the SC Project Company in-
clude various contracts (including feedstock and other input
and off-take agreements), the site lease for the land on which
the project is built, other real property rights and interests, ap-
provals and licenses, and intellectual property rights (including
technology rights and licenses) (collectively, "SC Project Docu-
ments"), cash, bank accounts, accounts receivable, immovables,
the assets comprising the project itself, computers, office equip-
ment, and other personal property (collectively, with the SC Pro-
ject Documents, "SC Collateral").
In addition, certain loans are made to the SC Project Com-
pany by SIDF pursuant to a loan agreement ("SIDF Loan Agree-
ment"), and those documents are secured by a mortgage and
pledge of certain assets of the SC Project Company pursuant to
the "SIDF Mortgage and Pledge." 9
Two entities act as adlan for the transaction, one for assets
of the SC Project Company that are located outside Saudi Arabia
("Offshore Security Agent") and one for the assets of the SC Pro-
ject Company that are located within Saudi Arabia ("Onshore
27. The Saudi Chevron project was the first limited recourse project financing in
Saudi Arabia and involved conventional interest-bearing loans rather than an Islamic
financing structure such as those discussed in this Essay. Therefore, the references to
"debt" and the debt portion of financing are retained in this Essay.
28. As is customary in project financings, the SC Project Company is a single-pur-
pose entity and has few assets other than such cash flows and the assets comprising the
project itself.
29. Difficult issues arose in connection with the inter-creditor arrangements be-
tween the SC Banks and SIDF. These issues were successfully resolved, in some cases
with unique arrangements and provisions. Those issues and the means of resolution
are not discussed in this Essay.
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Security Agent"). Collectively, the Offshore Security Agent and
the Onshore Security Agent are referred to as the "Security
Agents." The offshore assets of the SC Project Company are
principally cash receipts from offshore sales of benzene and cy-
clohexane. The onshore assets are principally the project itself
and related rights, titles, and interests.
B. Institutional Requirements
Financing for the project is provided by a group of interna-
tional, regional, and local SC Banks. In accordance with their
credit policies, the SC Banks have particular expectations as to
the type of collateral and the nature of the collateral security
interests that secure the loans. The international SC Banks, and
some of the regional SC Banks, are intimately familiar with a
variety of collateral security systems in different countries. They
are accustomed to advanced statutory collateral security systems
in which there are precise, but easily understood and imple-
mented, systems for recordation of mortgages, pledges, and
other security interests. Many of those SC Banks have precise
requirements as to the nature of the security interest that is per-
missible in a lending transaction, particularly a project financ-
ing, involving that SC Bank-perfection of the security interest
must be obtainable and the priority of the security interest must
rank ahead of all competing creditors-i.e., a first prior per-
fected security interest; the security interest must cover all the
assets comprising the project and those of the SC Project Com-
pany. Obviously the requirements are more stringent in a pro-
ject financing because the SC Banks do not have recourse to the
sponsors or any other parties or assets.
Some Middle Eastern regional SC Banks and most local
Saudi Arabian SC Banks have a somewhat different view of collat-
eral security, particularly in light of the absence of a recordation
system for mortgages, pledges, and security interests in Saudi
Arabia and due to the absence of a Saudi Arabian statute per-
taining to collateral security. While attempts have been made
over the years to achieve recordation and some type of perfec-
tion of a security interest in Saudi Arabia, most have been unsuc-
cessful, for both legal and political reasons. For example, as dis-
cussed below, "possession" of an asset is necessary for perfection
of a security interest under the Shari'ah (unlike American and
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English systems in which recordation of the nature and extent of
the security interest is the touchstone for perfection, without re-
gard to any concept of actual physical possession). Actual pos-
session is a difficult concept to achieve for many types of assets
(consider intellectual property rights) and for an operating
plant. Thus, local Saudi Arabian banks have focused more on
lending transactions involving recourse to a third party, such as a
guarantee by a parent company or individual shareholders in the
project company or its parent. To each of the SC Banks, max-
imization of an effective collateral security interest was, and is,
essential.
Chevron and SIVCG, like most project equity participants,
desired a true limited recourse financing, with recourse limited
to the SC Project Company and its cash flows and other assets.
Neither wanted to put the credit of its affiliates or shareholders
behind the financing obligations. Thus, both equity participants
desired to provide to the SC Banks a strong collateral security
package-a project financing will not be undertaken by the
lenders without an adequate collateral security package.
A sound security structure decreases transactional risks, with
a resultant decrease in financing costs for project financing in
the relevant jurisdiction. Such a cost decrease is desirable to all
project sponsors and developers because of the direct effect on
profitability. It is also desirable to the financing SC Banks be-
cause of enhanced project economics and increased ability of
the SC Project Company to repay financing obligations.
C. Development of the Collateral Security Structure
1. General Approach
The challenge that was presented to the lawyers by both the
SC Banks and the SC Project Company was to develop a collat-
eral security structure that met the project financing and related
credit requirements of all the SC Banks and was satisfactory to
the SC Project Company. A structure had to be developed that
met the traditional requirements of New York and English
financings but was consistent with the Shari'ah. In developing
such structures in other jurisdictions, lawyers and financiers be-
gin with the New York or English (i.e., Western) model as the
base structure. They then attempt to implement that model
within the framework of the host country's laws by adding to the
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model a variety of procedures and structures from the host coun-
try's practice. Those host country practices often have to be
modified to fit the pre-existing Western model. This often has
the effect of jeopardizing the effectiveness of the host country
procedure or structure, which, in turn, weakens the entire collat-
eral security structure.
The approach taken for the Saudi Chevron financing was
the opposite: The determination was made to build the base
model structure from the point of view of the host legal system,
the Shari'ah. Thereafter, additions and modifications were made
to incorporate procedures and structures from the Western
model more familiar to the international SC Banks.
The adoption of this approach was the direct result of dis-
cussions with the various Shari'ah advisors, Saudi Arabian law-
yers, and, in particular, Saudi Arabian jurists. Through those
discussions, it became apparent that, the Western conception
that there was greater certainty in using Western collateral secur-
ity structures, was incorrect where legal interpretation might be
had in Saudi Arabia. For example, Saudi Arabian jurists are ac-
customed to thinking in terms of Shari'ah precepts and to oper-
ating within the Shari'ah system. Our discussions revealed that
they did not consistently interpret Western legal language and
structures. Greater consistency and predictability was obtained
in their interpretations of Shari'ah precepts. In addition, it was
thought to be a much more advisable course because there is
greater flexibility in the New York and English legal systems as
regards to collateral security and there is greater certainty as to
the implementation of certain relevant legal structures (particu-
larly Western elements of the structure) in those offshore juris-
dictions. This makes it easier to mold the Western concepts to
the Islamic model than vice versa. In addition, and in light of
the necessity of asset possession under Islamic law but not New
York or English law, we anticipated that we would be able to
move certain assets (such as cash from offshore product sales) to
an offshore jurisdiction, using those assets as "first-line" collat-
eral, and then feed cash back into the onshore jurisdiction for
use in conjunction with the assets comprising the "second-line"
or "ultimate" collateral.
When a project experiences difficulties, calls on collateral
are often sequential and predictable. Lenders rarely foreclose
on all the collateral, although they almost always have the right
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to do so. Rather, they attempt to minimize their intrusion into
the operations of the borrower and they proceed against the as-
sets in a definable sequence (beginning, in most cases, with cash
and other liquid assets). To give effect to those realities, the SC
Financing Agreements and SC Security Documents were struc-
tured to allocate cash to problem areas without resorting to the
more drastic step of calling upon other assets. The security in-
terest in the cash is held, in the first instance, in an offshore
jurisdiction with which the international SC Banks are familiar
and which meets the credit requirements of those international
SC Banks. This satisfies the SC Banks' standards for first-line
calls on collateral and the nature and extent of the security inter-
est itself. In the Saudi Chevron transaction, England was chosen
as such a jurisdiction (New York would have worked equally as
well).
The remaining task was to demonstrate to the SC Banks that
a satisfactory security interest could be obtained under the
Shari'ah in Saudi Arabia. As anticipated, it was not an easy task
to convince the SC Banks that such a security interest was satis-
factory under their Western-focused credit policies. There was a
perception that an adequate security interest is difficult to obtain
under the Shari'ah, and even more difficult to obtain in Saudi
Arabia and that the nature of the security interest is uncertain.
The perception was strongest among those unfamiliar with the
Shari'ah (which was most of the people involved in the transac-
tion). Few completed project financings have joined Islamic and
American/European security concepts and it was our challenge
to effect that joinder.
2. Scientific Method
The Saudi Chevron collateral security structure was devel-
oped from first principles under relevant Shari'ah precepts, par-
ticularly under the Hanbali School of Islamic jurisprudence pre-
dominant in Saudi Arabia. Our first task was to achieve both a
comprehensive understanding of the relevant Shari'ah principles
and a precise understanding of how those principles compared,
point-by-point, with similar Western concepts. We enlisted a
group of legal scholars and Shari'ah advisors to supplement the
team of lawyers. We provided the scholars, advisors, and lawyers
with a detailed description of how a transaction would be struc-
tured under a Western model, including descriptions of the im-
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portance and legal effect of each structural element. They, in
turn, provided a similar description of how a transaction would
be structured under the Shari'ah, with similar explanatory mater-
ials. There was considerable back and forth in arriving at a com-
parative outline of the two different structures and in achieving a
basic understanding of that model.
We then began to probe the legal principles pertaining to
each element of the structure in the context of a construction
and long-term financing for an operating plant. We began with
a series of general questions: How do you get a security interest
under the Shari'ah with respect to a given type of collateral?
What is the nature of the security interest? What degree of cer-
tainty can we have with respect to any given security interest?
What is necessary to retain that security interest? How is the se-
curity interest enforced? What are the respective rights and re-
sponsibilities of each of the involved parties? Why was a given
element present? Why was it structured as suggested? What if
the facts changed in this way or that way? What is the Islamic
equivalent of a given Western element, if any, and vice versa?
Would a different procedure or technique under the Shari'ah
better serve the requirements of the project participants? As we
moved from the general to the specific, the list of questions ran
into the thousands and the process was repeated a number of
times as the answers, and the model, were refined.
As an example, we examined each category of assets
(marhoun) comprising a project or held by a project company
and relevant Shari'ah precepts for granting a rahn (mortgage
and pledge) or assignment with respect to each such category.
Categories included real estate interests (site leases and ease-
ments), immovable property (the plant), movable property
(computers and equipment), cash (from sales, investments, and
insurance), bank accounts, contracts, accounts receivable, intel-
lectual property, technology licenses, and permits. Certain types
of property fall into multiple categories and were appropriately
analyzed.
As the model developed, we expanded our participant list
from transactional lawyers, legal scholars, and Shari'ah consul-
tants to include judges from the Board of Grievances of The
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We wanted to achieve an understand-
ing of how Shari'ah precepts pertaining to each element of the
structure (and the developing documentation) might be applied
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in specific factual situations. And, as noted above, our discus-
sions were leading us to the conclusion that greater certainty
and predictability would be achieved if our structure was
Shari 'ah-based.
Given the complexities of a project financing of a large in-
dustrial project, we began with a much simpler analogy. We pos-
ited a simple loan from one person to another that was secured
by a rahn (mortgage or pledge) of a camel. Our questions were
retailored to this analogy. Can a rahn be granted with respect to
the camel? What are the necessary elements of a valid and en-
forceable rahn? Who is responsible for feeding the camel? Who
is responsible for caring for the camel? Who is responsible for
the security of the camel? Can the camel be milked? Can the
milk be sold? Who is entitled to the cash received from the sale
of the milk and how should that cash be applied? What are the
respective rights and obligations with respect to care of the
camel during the period of the rahn? What are the rights and
responsibilities of the parties if the camel becomes ill? Can a
subsequent loan be made that is also secured by the camel? Will
that security interest come into effect automatically or will other
steps have to be taken to ensure the effectiveness of the new se-
curity interest? What if the camel delivers a calf? Does the credi-
tor automatically obtain a rahn over the calf? How and when can
the rahn be enforced?
We then repeated the process on a comparative basis for a
loan secured by land and equipment. As the understanding of
the precepts and their application developed, we expanded the
inquiry to include other types of marhoun (collateral).
This list of detailed questions became lengthy, and the con-
versations even more intricate. The discussions were penetrat-
ing, fascinating, and enlightening for all persons involved. De-
spite the intellectual rigor of the undertaking, humor permeated
the entire process. As the model got refined in accordance with
Shari'ah precepts, we achieved a more precise understanding of
the type of structural bridges that would have to be constructed
to the relevant Western concepts so as to maintain familiarity to
the international SC Banks and to ensure the effectiveness of the
entire collateral security structure.
As discussed below, the primary bridge between the Shari'ah
structure and the Western concepts familiar to the international
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SC Banks was the incorporation into the collateral security struc-
ture of an adl. American and European financings usually in-
volve a trustee that holds collateral on behalf of lenders. The
Shari'ah does not provide for trustees, at least in a Western sense.
However, the Shari'ah has long experience with a similar con-
cept, the adl. In brief, an adl is a trusted and honorable person
selected by both the lender and the borrower, a type of "trustee-
arbitrator" having certain fiduciary responsibilities to both par-
ties. In addition to providing the necessary structural bridge, in-
corporation of the adl into the structure also solved or mini-
mized numerous difficult issues under Saudi Arabian law, some
of which are discussed in the Section V(D).
D. Exemplary Major Issues and Resolutions
The structure that was developed for the Saudi Chevron
project involved the grant of a rahn with respect to the marhoun
to two adlan. A rahn is a type of mortgage (with respect to real
property) and pledge (with respect to personal property) of
property (marhoun) that meets certain requirements. The adlan
are the Onshore Security Agent and the Offshore Security
Agent.30
30. The development of the collateral security structure, and the sharikat mahassa-
murabaha and istisna'a-ijara structures, entailed study of many written sources and dis-
cussions with Shari'ah advisors, Islamic bankers, Saudi Arabian judges, and lawyers prac-
ticing in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Pakistan, and the United States. Many of the Shari'ah
principles described in this Essay are based on oral discussions with such persons and
with the Shari'ah Supervisory Boards of Islamic institutions who have been involved in
the transactions described in this Essay and other Shari'ah-compliant transactions.
Many of the written sources are available only in the Arabic language. The most widely
available summary of Shari'ah precepts in the English language is the Majalat Al-Ahkam
Al-Adliyah, a summary of certain principles of the Shari'ah as applied by the Hanafi
School of Islamic jurisprudence in the former Ottoman Empire and countries that were
formerly part thereof; it was officially adopted in the Ottoman Empire. The Majalat Al-
Ahkam AI-Shar'iyah is a summary of certain principles of the Shari'ah as applied by the
Hanbali School of Islamic jurisprudence in The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It has not
been officially adopted in Saudi Arabia. It is not as detailed as the Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-
Adliyah. English language translations of relevant portions of the Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-
Shar'iyah were prepared for the author expressly for the development of the collateral
security structure for the Saudi Chevron transaction.
Throughout this Essay, footnote references are made to the translation of the
Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah made by JUDGE C. A. HOOPER, THE CIVIL LAW OF PALESTINE
AND TRANS-JORDAN, VOLUME I & II (1933), reprinted in 4 ARAB L. Q. (Aug. 1986). Foot-
note references to the Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Shar'iyah are to a translation made for the
author by M.Z. Samhouri and Hassan M.S. Mahassni, each of the Law Office of Hassan
Mahassni in association with White & Case LLP, and to translations of portions of the
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Implementing the structure involved addressing a variety of
legal and financial issues, some of which are noted in this Essay.
This Essay first discusses certain Saudi Arabian legal principles
bearing on the location of assets. Consideration is then given to
the issue of "certainty" of a grant of a rahn (and with respect to
the taking of various actions by the holder of the security inter-
est). Resolution of these issues led to incorporation of the adl
into the collateral security structure. Thereafter, the Essay out-
lines various factors pertaining to the nature of a rahn with re-
spect to different categories of collateral.
1. Location of Assets; Governing Law
One of the initial structural determinations was to use both
an offshore and an onshore security agent. A security interest in
the cash proceeds from the sale of benzene and cyclohexane
produced by the project first would be deposited in an English
bank account, held with the Offshore Security Agent pursuant to
English law, and a security interest would be taken in that bank
account. As, and when, needed, cash would then be transferred
to an onshore bank account held by the Onshore Security Agent
pursuant to Saudi Arabian law. Similarly, in light of Saudi Ara-
Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Shar'iyah, and certain applicable fatawa, made by Hafedh
Maamouri, currently Senior Consultant with Islamic Finance Consultants in Manama,
Bahrain, and then Head of Islamic Banking for Saudi American Bank.
Cites to the Majalat A1-Ahkam Al-Adliyah are most often made without further refer-
ence to the Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Shar'iyah. In many instances, no corresponding provi-
sion can be found in the Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Shar'iyah. In some instances the cited
principle is interpreted or applied differently, or with modifications, by Saudi Arabian
jurists applying principles of the Hanbali School of Islamic jurisprudence. Many such
differences or modifications were made known to the author orally in discussions and
no specific reference is made in this Essay to the variations from the Majalat Al-Ahkam
AI-Adliyah. Although not all such differences are discussed in this Essay, the various
documents for the financings of the Saudi Chevron Project (in particular), the Utility
Power Project, the Maconda Park Project and the Truman Park Project included adap-
tations to give effect to those differences.
Each of the Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Shar'iyah and the Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah use a
single Arabic word (al-rahn) for security interests in both real and personal property,
without distinction, and the author follows that convention in this Essay. However, in
certain instances, the author has chosen to use an English language term. In partial
conformity with the Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Shar'iyah and the Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah,
only the English terms "mortgage" and "pledge" are used. The term "mortgage" refers
to security interests in real property and other immovable property (essentially "fix-
tures" under New York and English law), while the term "pledge" refers to all security
interests in personal property, including contract rights, cash, accounts, movable assets,
permits, and intellectual property.
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bian and Shari'ah possession concepts, certain other assets (such
as executed original copies of certain contracts and negotiable
instruments) were also located in England with the Offshore Se-
curity Agent, with a security interest obtained in those assets pur-
suant to English law.
Concurrently, decisions were made as to what law should
govern the various documents in the transaction. It was deter-
mined that, to the extent possible and practicable, English law
would govern the SC Facilities Agreement and certain other SC
Financing Agreements and those collateral security agreements
that pertained to assets located in England (most notably, the
cash receipts account). The remaining documents would be
governed by Saudi Arabian law. As a result, two separate sets of
documents were constructed, each harmonious with the other.
This structure resulted in careful drafting of procedures for con-
temporaneous operation under each set of documents and co-
operation between the two adlan (security agents), particularly
as regards cash movements and any possible exercise of reme-
dies.
2. Certainty: Powers of Attorney; Agency; The Adl
Characterization of a given grant of rights (such as in re-
spect of collateral) is somewhat uncertain under Saudi Arabian
law. For example, various security arrangements may be charac-
terized as "powers of attorney" given by the SC Project Company
to the SC Banks, with the SC Banks (and the Security Agents)
being characterized as mere "agents" of the SC Project Com-
pany.
Many, if not most, judges in Saudi Arabia take the position
that such powers of attorney and most agency arrangements are
revocable at will by either party under the Shari'ah and other
Saudi Arabian law. 1 If so, the SC Project Company would be in
31. Under the Shari'ah, it is unlikely that a mortgage or pledge would constitute a
nominate contract of assignment (hawala). The Islamic contract of hawala, which
means literally to "turn over," contemplates a situation where a creditor, A, assigns to
his own creditor, C, a debt which is owed to A by B. In order for this contract to be
effective as a contract of hawala, the amount owed to A by B must equal exactly the
amount owed by A to C. Furthermore, A must be indebted to C and B must be in-
debted to A at the time the contract of hawala is concluded. The contract of hawala
may not relate to future indebtedness, a particularly thorny issue in an ongoing funding
regime for a project financing.
It is unclear under the Shari'ah whether other rights ancillary to the right to receive
2001] 1213
1214 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:1184
a position to revoke the power of attorney and the agency ar-
rangement, and thus the security interest given to the SC Banks,
at the will of the SC Project Company. To the extent that the
Banks derive their rights indirectly, through a security agree-
ment, rather than directly, as a party to a contract, the SC Pro-
ject Company may therefore be able to terminate the rights of
the Banks. However, even under construction of relevant
Shari'ah precepts by jurists applying the Hanbali School of Is-
lamic jurisprudence, the use of a rahn-adl structure confers a de-
gree of irrevocability not otherwise found.
Further, there is an exception to the irrevocability rule
under certain schools of Islamic jurisprudence. That exception
makes grants of agency power, and powers of attorney, when
coupled with an interest of third parties, irrevocable when a
third party relies upon such irrevocability. There is some debate
among jurists in the Hanbali School as to the extent to which
such an exception exists in Saudi Arabia. In any event, jurists of
the Hanbali School would likely give the narrowest reading to
the exception to revocability."
payment, for example the right to accelerate payment upbn the occurrence of a speci-
fied default or the right to claim under a tax indemnification provision, are in fact
'turned over" to the assignee. With respect to ancillary rights, it can be argued that A
may only grant to C the power to act as A's agent in enforcing them, again subject to
the various conditions applicable to contracts of agency.
A contract of assignment that does not meet the narrow conditions of the nomi-
nate contract of hawala will, generally speaking, be considered to be a contract of
wakala, or agency. In other words, in the present case, under the various SC Security
Documents, the SC Project Company would be considered to have granted the Security
Agents what is effectively a power of attorney empowering the Security Agents to exer-
cise all or certain of the borrower's (i.e., the SC Project Company's) rights under the
various SC Project Documents being assigned.
The characterization of a mortgage or pledge (rahn) as a contract of wakala has
several implications. First, under the Shari'ah as applied in Saudi Arabia, contracts of
agency are generally considered to be cancelable at will by either the principal or the
agent. (An exception is noted in the text of this Essay.) Second, where a principal
grants to an agent the power to exercise certain of the principal's rights, the principal
retains the power to exercise such rights in its own name independently of the power in
the agent and the actions of the principal would be superior to those of the agent
(which would be unacceptable to the banks in any financing). Third, a Saudi Arabian
court or other adjudicatory authority might construe the grant of the power of agency
pursuant to a mortgage or pledge narrowly, finding that the Security Agent has only
such powers as are expressly granted thereunder.
32. Notably, where a power of attorney or agency relationship is revoked contrary
to the terms of the documents granting such power and one of the parties is thereby
harmed, an appeal can be made to the Saudi Arabian courts for relief, as an equitable
matter, to make the harmed person whole.
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Notwithstanding the strict mandates of the law, however,
there is a trend in Saudi Arabian legal practice toward recogni-
tion of irrevocability in certain situations. For example, the
Saudi Arabian courts have recently indicated that an agency rela-
tionship or a power of attorney may not be revocable if there is a
specified term for the existence of the agency relationship or the
duration of the power of attorney. In addition, the SAMA Com-
mittee attempts to interpret contracts in accordance with the ex-
pressed agreement of the parties, even where there is a seeming
conflict with the Shari'ah.33
In addition, under Saudi Arabian agency law, the principal
(i.e., the SC Project Company) is always entitled to act whether
or not the agent (i.e., the Security Agents and the SC Banks) is
also entitled to act. The actions and directions of the principal
will supersede those of the agent-a most undesirable outcome
in a project financing.
Saudi Arabian law, however, acknowledges a type of mort-
gage/pledge arrangement, al-rahn, which is of particular rele-
vance to this financing. Al-rahn is the making of a designated
property into security for a debt that may be partially or totally
recovered from such property or the price thereof. 4 In a rahn,
the definite property that is made a security for a debt, al-
marhoun, may be deposited with a type of trustee-arbitrator, a
trusted person mutually agreed upon by the parties, al-adl.35
This device is similar in some ways to a bailment arrangement
under New York or English law. The practice in Saudi Arabia is
that either or both of the rahn documents and the marhoun may
be deposited with the adl.3 6 The nature of the rahn, and the
rights and powers of an adl, with respect to the exercise of con-
33. Interpretation issues are discussed in Section IV of this Essay. The SAMA Com-
mittee (officially, the Banking Disputes Settlement Committee of the Saudi Arabian
Monetary Agency) is the enforcement entity in Saudi Arabia that is most likely to have
jurisdiction in a dispute pertaining to a financing such a the Saudi Chevron project
financing. However, as discussed in Section IV, it is not the only entity that may have
jurisdiction.
34. See, e.g., Majalat al-Ahkam AI-Shar'iyah, supra note 30, arts. 940-44, 1008-1017,
Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah, supra note 30, arts. 701-61.
35. The marhoun may also be held by the mortgagee or pledgee, and the adl may
be one of the mortgagees or pledgees.
36. The rahn structure has been useful in financings of residential property, for
example.
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tractual rights under third party contracts that are the subject of
a pledge is not well developed.
However, it is established that the marhoun and/or the rahn
documents may be placed with the adl and may not be removed
from the adl's possession without the agreement of both the
mortgagor/pledgor and the mortgagee/pledgee,3 7 and posses-
sion may not be returned to the mortgagor/pledgor without the
consent of both such parties in interest. The adl may not sell the
property given as security without the consent of both such par-
ties in interest. That consent, however, may be provided in the
rahn documents, which are executed at the commencement of
the rahn transaction. Such consent will not be treated as a revo-
cable power of attorney.3" There are various other requirements
that must be met in connection with a valid rahn with an adl.
The implications of the foregoing for the Saudi Chevron
project financing were considerable. First, the structure in-
cluded two adlan, one offshore and one onshore. Irrevocable
grants were made to the adlan, and the SC Project Company, as
mortgagor/pledgor, explicitly and irrevocably, authorized the
adlan to do various things and take various actions from time to
time on the occurrence of specific conditions (such as sales of
the items of collateral upon the occurrence of an event of de-
fault and the exercise of other remedies in connection with an
event of default). These authorizations were substantially more
specific and detailed than would have been the case in a docu-
ment governed by New York or English law where there is a sub-
stantial body of determinable interpretive precedent and the
principle of stare decisis is applicable. The nuances of these doc-
trines under the Shari'ah were also addressed in detailed draft-
ing.
The use of recitals to an agreement governed by New York
or English law has diminished greatly in recent years. In some
cases, the recitals continue to provide some evidence of the legal
consideration for the agreements embodied therein. Although
there is no equivalent body of law with respect to legal considera-
tion under the Shari'ah, the use of detailed recitals is important
37. If the parties so agree, only the consent of the mortgagee/pledgee will be re-
quired.
38. There are various instances in which consents must or may be obtained in
connection with the application of Shari'ah precepts relating to the rahn. In many of
those instances, the consent may be obtained at the time of entering into the rahn.
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for other reasons. This is particularly true in a financing such as
the Saudi Chevron transaction. Thus, detailed recitals and sub-
stantive provisions of the agreements were constructed to make
it clear that an agency relationship was not, and is not, contem-
plated, and that the rights afforded the Security Agents on be-
half of the SC Banks are irrevocable and coupled with an inter-
est. The nature of the interest and the reliance of the SC Banks
and the Security Agents on the rahn and their irrevocability was
addressed in detail.
To render even greater certainty to the structure, the SC
Banks, directly in certain documents and through the Security
Agents in other documents, became parties to agreements that
they might have to enforce in the exercise of their rights under
those agreements or under any of the SC Security Documents.
This resulted in the SC Banks becoming direct parties to more
documents than would have been the. case in a transaction gov-
erned by New York or English law and the Security Agents be-
coming direct parties to certain other undertakings and guaran-
tees that may otherwise have been unilaterally executed by the
SC Project Company or other grantor. Such a structural modifi-
cation allows the SC Banks directly to enforce the SC Security
Documents should it be determined that they are unable to act
through the Security Agents with respect to a given matter.
Another device that was used included having the Security
Agents become "parties" to various underlying SC Project Docu-
ments. This was accomplished by virtue of having the parties to
the SC Project Documents execute relatively standard "direct
agreements" or "acknowledgments and consents" ("SC Con-
sents"). In the usual case, these SC Consents contain an ac-
knowledgment by the third party that the SC Project Company
has granted a security interest in the referenced contract to
which the SC Consent relates. They also contain a consent to
the pledge of the referenced SC Project Document. In Saudi
Arabia, however, the SC Consents contained an explicit acknowl-
edgment by the SC Project Company and the third parties that
the Security Agents have the irrevocable right to enforce the un-
derlying SC Project Document upon certain events (such as an
event of default under the SC Financing Agreements). Most of
the other requirements for such direct enforcement are in-
cluded in standard consents of this type. These arrangements
were designed to effect an "amendment" to each of the underly-
2001] 1217
1218 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:1184
ing SC Project Documents with respect to which a SC Consent
was, or is, executed, making the Security Agents direct "parties"
to those agreements, to a limited extent. This element of the
structure helped alleviate certain of the revocability issues and
other Saudi Arabian legal limitations pertaining to collateral as-
signments of contracts. The Security Agents will be able to en-
force the various SC Project Documents in their own right upon
the occurrence of events of default under the SC Financing
Agreements, without having to proceed under the various collat-
eral assignments.
Specific substantive issues arising under the Shari'ah, which
would not be addressed in detail in a document governed by
New York or English law, were also the subject of precise draft-
ing. For example, the SC Security Documents expressly deline-
ate the rights and powers of the adlan in a variety of situations,
including a power and right of occupation, use, and operation of
the marhoun upon the occurrence of an event of default and, as
to the application of the proceeds of occupation, use and opera-
tion until satisfaction of the outstanding indebtedness.3 9 The SC
Security Documents specify that the parties intend that the
grants of rights and powers to the Security Agents are coupled
with an interest and irrevocable. The SC Security Documents
also specify that the SC Banks in entering into the transaction
have relied on such grants and irrevocability. Grants of powers
and rights to the Security Agents are structured to be exclusive
of powers and rights in the SC Project Company during the con-
tinuance of an event of default, with significantly more separa-
tion of rights than would otherwise be the case. The general
language that is found in New York and English security agree-
ments will likely be unavailing in Saudi Arabia, which interprets
such grants literally based on express language.
39. The rights of banks to use and operate property that is mortgaged or pledged
as collateral, and to apply the proceeds derived from such use and operation to indebt-
edness secured thereby, is unclear under Saudi Arabian law. The practice in Saudi
Arabia is for banks to sell the property granted as collateral rather than to operate such
property and apply such proceeds. However, the Shari'ah, the Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Ad-
liyah, the Majalat Al-Ahkam AI-Shar'iyah, and the Saudi Arabian Banking Control Law do
contemplate such use and operation and the application of such proceeds. For exam-
ple, a camel provided as security must be fed and cared for, and may be milked. The
milk may be sold and the proceeds of such sale may be applied to the reduction of the
secured debt. This is similar to the fruit of trees on land with respect to which a rahn
has been granted.
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In light of recent Saudi Arabian court decisions, the dura-
tion of the grant of a security interest was expressly stated as a
quantifiable measurement of time. This should provide for ir-
revocability in the event of recharacterization as a power of attor-
ney. For example, the term was set as some period of years be-
yond the term of the debt (to allow for enforcement upon de-
fault), with an earlier termination if all obligations of the SC
Project Company under the SC Financing Agreements and the
SC Security Documents are paid and performed in full.
3. Rahn Principles in Saudi Arabia
The land on which the Saudi Chevron project has been con-
structed is owned by the Royal Commission forJubail and Yanbu
of The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ("Royal Commission"). The
land is leased to the SC Project Company pursuant to a type of
land lease agreement ("SC Site Lease"). In the traditional struc-
ture, such leasehold interest of the SC Project Company would
then be mortgaged to the Onshore Security Agent pursuant to a
leasehold mortgage agreement to secure the obligations of the
SC Project Company under the various SC Financing Agree-
ments, in particular the SC Facilities Agreement and the SC
Notes.
Under Saudi Arabian law, a mortgage of real property is
treated, in most respects, identically with the treatment of a
pledge of personal property.4 ° Real property may be made the
subject of a mortgage and used as collateral to secure indebted-
ness.'" Personal property may also be made the subject of a
40. Because the term "rahn" encompasses both mortgages and pledges, and be-
cause mortgages of real property and pledges of personal property are treated identi-
cally for most purposes under the Shari'ah, and a rahn encompasses both mortgages
and pledges, the outline of legal principles in this section makes reference to principles
applicable to both types of property, except where otherwise noted by use of the term
"mortgage" or "pledge."
See generally FARHATJ. ZIADEH, PROPERTY LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD: REAL RIGHTS IN
Ecyir, IRAO,JoPDAN, LEBANON, LIBYA, SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES (1979)
(discussing an interesting and informative, if dated, comparative analysis of property
law in the Middle East and North Africa). Chapter VI addresses mortgages, pledges,
and other security interests. Id. Due to the absence of a statutory framework, the chap-
ter is not helpful in considering the applicable law in Saudi Arabia.
41. See, e.g., Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah, supra note 30, arts. 711, 723, 724. SIDF
takes a mortgage on leasehold interests. Similarly, in practice, other real property inter-
ests may be subjected to a mortgage.
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pledge and used as collateral to secure indebtedness. 42  In-
creases in the value of the marhoun, additions to such property,
and products from the operation of a project are automatically
subject to the rahn under Shari'ah precepts as applied by some
schools of Islamic jurisprudence. Under such precepts as ap-
plied by other schools, they may be made subject to the rahn by
some definitive action or agreement. In each case, interpreta-
tions and applications of these precepts vary.43
The indebtedness may be totally or partially recovered from
the marhoun,4 4 and the entirety of the marhoun will remain sub-
ject to the rahn until payment in full of the indebtedness.45 The
marhoun must be something that can be validly sold. As such, it
must (i) be in existence at the time of the execution of the con-
tract of rahn, (ii) have a quantifiable value, and (iii) be saleable
and deliverable. 46 Accordingly, a rahn of "after acquired" (in-
cluding "subsequently constructed") property is invalid.4 ' The
"benefits" of a property may not be mortgaged or pledged sepa-
rately from such property. Thus, rent generated by, or the sales
proceeds of products produced by, a property may not be mort-
gaged or pledged without a corresponding rahn of such underly-
ing property. 48  Uncertain sums may not be mortgaged or
42. See, e.g., id. arts. 711, 714. As noted in this Essay, certain types of personal
property rights may not be pledged, they must be assigned. Assignment agreements
(often incorporated into the relevant SC Pledge (Rahn) Agreement) were used for
granting rights in such property in the Saudi Chevron financing. In Saudi Arabia, intel-
lectual property is subject to a special set of rules; such rules are not discussed in this
Essay.
43. See, e.g., id. art. 711 (defining rahn of a piece of land as including all trees
growing thereon and the fruits of such trees); id. art. 715 (discussing increases arising
out of pledge or mortgage).
44. See, e.g., id. arts. 711, 712, 723, 724 (citing examples of pledges).
45. See id. art. 731.
46. See id. arts. 709, 710.
47. Id. art. 713. This precept, as applied in Saudi Arabia, is critical to many aspects
of a project financing structure. In the usual case, the SC Financing Agreements would
be executed before there is any real collateral (other than SC Project Documents).
Thus, essentially all of the marhoun is "after-acquired" or "after-constructed." In the
Saudi Chevron financing, various structural modifications were made to continually up-
date the SC Collateral and include all SC Project Company assets therein. Some of
those modifications are discussed in this Essay.
48. This element of Saudi Arabian law presented interesting issues at the time that
SIDF entered the financing structure (which was some time after the SC Banks had
undertaken their financing obligations). SIDF, for example, was interested in taking a
mortgage in the property but in leaving the revenue from operations to the SC Banks as
collateral security.
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pledged.4" An existing rahn may not be valid with respect to fu-
ture advances or loans in the view of some Islamic jurists, partic-
ularly in Saudi Arabia.5 ° Finally, assets that are "borrowed" for
use by a borrower may not be mortgaged or pledged."'
Under the Shari'ah, the mortgagee/pledgee is responsible
for all expenses incurred in connection with the preservation of
the rahn, such as the erection of the fence around the property,
the wages and fees of the Security Agents, the wages of the guard
posted at the property, the cost of erection of the signs, and the
like.52 The mortgagor/pledgor is responsible for all expenses in
connection with the improvement and maintenance of the
marhoun, including repairs and operation and maintenance ex-
penses.53 Any agreement modifying these allocations is void. If
either the mortgagor/pledgor or the mortgagee/pledgee
should of their own accord pay the expenses that are rightly paid
by the other party, such payment is in the nature of a gift and no
subsequent claim may be made for such amounts. 54
Under the Shari'ah, a rahn is, by definition, possessory. The
Qur'an refers to the idea of mortgages as "mortgages with posses-
sion" (fa rihanun maqboudha). Thus, in order for the security in-
terest purported to be created by a rahn agreement to be per-
fected (i.e., to be enforceable against third-party creditors), the
mortgagee/pledgee must have "possession" of the marhoun. If
the mortgagee/pledgee ceases to have "possession" of the
marhoun, such mortgagee/pledgee will be treated as an ordinary
creditor and would have the same rights as other creditors in the
collection of their debts-i.e., a pro rata share in the proceeds of
the sale of those properties of the debtor that have not been
mortgaged or pledged.
In the absence of a clear practical definition of what consti-
tutes "possession," most jurists in Saudi Arabia appear to have
taken the position that what is required is actual physical posses-
sion by the mortgagee/pledgee of the marhoun. However, a
49. See, e.g., Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah, supra note 30, art. 709.
50. But see, id. art. 714.
51. But see, id. arts. 726-28, 735, 736.
52. Id. art. 723.
53. Id. art. 724. In many instances, it is difficult to determine whether a specific
arrangement or undertaking is one for "preservation" of the asset or for "operation and
maintenance" of the asset in the normal course. Consider, for example, a fence around
the property or the guard at the front and back gates of the property.
54. Id. art. 725.
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principle of the Shari'ah is that "possession is in accordance
with the nature of the property to be possessed" (qulu shay in
yuqbadhu bi hasabihi) and in many instances physical possession is
an impossibility.
Perfection of a rahn on real property or a real property in-
terest in Saudi Arabia would be normally effected by (a) the
preparation of a rahn agreement (in the form of a deed) and (b)
the recordation of such rahn agreement on the title deed evi-
dencing ownership of the relevant real property or real property
interest.
Recordation of the rahn agreement has been deemed in
Saudi Arabia to be a type of "constructive possession" of the
marhoun.5 Since 1981, Saudi Arabian Public Notaries have re-
fused to record mortgages of real property in the name of banks
as mortgagees on the grounds that such mortgages secure an
indebtedness that is most likely related to a transaction that is
interest-based and therefore inconsistent with the Shari'ah.5 6
Thus, recordation of the SC Mortgage (Rahn), as a substitute
for, and determinative indictor of, possession by the mortgagee
is not presently available in Saudi Arabia for commercial banks
as mortgagees.57 Recordation is available to a very limited and
55. It is to be noted that "constructive possession" is a concept that is not incorpo-
rated in the Shari'ah. The term is used here solely as an analogy that is familiar to
United States and English lawyers and financiers, and further discussion of the princi-
ple is provided in this Essay.
Recordation of real property in Saudi Arabia is effected by the Public Notaries
according to the system of personal recording (in the name of the owners of the real
property) since there is no separate record and number for each parcel of real prop-
erty. In recording a rahn of real property, the Public Notaries inscribe the full text of
the rahn agreement on the title deed for the particular property and deliver such deed
to the mortgagee. Because of the present lack of recordation in Saudi Arabia, an owner
of mortgaged real property (the debtor/mortgagor) is not precluded from obtaining a
replacement deed (in lieu of the one claimed lost). Thus, such debtor/mortgagor is
capable of disposing of such property, by sale or by other property-transferring disposi-
tions, without the consent or knowledge of the mortgagee if the mortgagee is not in
possession of such property. Even where there is recordation, Public Notaries require
that an annotation be inscribed indicating that the mortgagee has possession of the
mortgaged property, and are often very strict in this respect. It is not clear that Public
Notaries would be amenable to undertaking not to issue replacement deeds for a partic-
ular parcel of land.
56. See Supreme Judiciary Council Decision No. 291, dated 25/10/1401 A.H.
(Aug. 25, 1981).
57. There is some difference of opinion as to whether recordation of a mortgage is
merely evidence of the existence of the mortgage or goes to the validity of the mortgage
itself. The weight of authority in Saudi Arabia, particularly given the present practice in
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identifiable group of lenders, including SIDF. Other indicators
of "possession" include "bills of possession," fencing, signs, the
presence of an employee or agent of the Onshore Security Agent
exercising dominion and control, and similar factors.58
Provided that a mortgagee/pledgee has possession of the
marhoun, such mortgagee/pledgee has priority under the
Shari'ah over all other creditors of the debtor in the collection of
the secured amounts owed to such mortgagee/pledgee from the
value of the marhoun. The marhoun may not be separately mort-
gaged or pledged to another mortgagee/pledgee (unless such
other mortgagee/pledgee is a partner of the original mortga-
gee/pledgee and the marhoun is mortgaged or pledged to them
jointly) because, if such property is mortgaged or pledged to the
second mortgagee/pledgee with the consent of the first mortga-
gee/pledgee, the first rahn becomes void. 9
Neither the mortgagor/pledgor nor the mortgagee/
which recordation is not available, is that recordation speaks only as evidence of the
existence of the mortgage.
58. Local banks in Saudi Arabia have utilized a number of techniques to obtain
recordation in the face of the unwillingness of Public Notaries to record. For example,
banks have used nominee individuals or companies as mortgagees. More recently,
Saudi Public Notaries have refused to record mortgages in favor of any individual or
company other than government-owned lending agencies, on the grounds that such
individuals or companies are likely to be acting only as nominees for local banks en-
gaged in lending transactions inconsistent with the Shari'ah.
Prior to the absolute prohibition on recordation (other than for SIDF and similar
entities), another alternative device to obtain adequate collateralization was the transfer
of title to the mortgaged real property to a nominee individual (such as a bank officer)
or company (such as a company formed by certain shareholders of the bank). The
borrower would sell the real property to the nominee individual or company at a nomi-
nal price and transfer the title deed to such nominee. The bank would then provide
contractually (usually through a "trusteeship" agreement), and through control over
the relevant individual or company, that the property so held is held for the benefit of
the bank and for the proceeds of any sale to be paid to the bank. Concurrently, the
borrower would sign a letter granting the nominee-trustee the right to arrange the sale
of the security on first demand.
This solution has not been wholly satisfactory to most local banks, as disputes have
arisen upon the death of a nominee or disagreements have arisen among shareholders
of the nominee company. There have been, however, several examples where banks
have successfully used this mechanism to realize value on their real property collateral
by arranging for the sale of such property.
59. Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah, supra note 30, art. 744. This precept and its appli-
cation gave rise to delicate structural and drafting issues where both the Banks and
SIDF took security interests in the same property. In other transactions, SIDF has per-
mitted second mortgages without regard to the extinguishment possibility. The author
is aware of no actions in Saudi Arabia in which the cited principle has been tested.
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pledgee may sell the collateral without the consent of the
other.6" If the secured debt becomes due and the debtor/mort-
gagor/pledgor does not satisfy the debt obligation, the mortga-
gee/pledgee will not obtain title to the marhoun.61 Rather, aju-
dicially-directed sale of the marhoun, initiated at the request of
the mortgagee/pledgee, would take place.62 The mortgagee/
pledgee would have priority with respect to those sale proceeds
in satisfaction of the secured amounts owed to such mortgagee/
pledgee by the debtor/mortgagor/pledgor. In the event that
the proceeds from the sale of the marhoun are less than the
amount of the debt secured by the rahn, the mortgagee/pledgee
has the right to share with other creditors in the value of the
debtor's remaining property.
Prior to a judicially directed sale of the marhoun, it may be
necessary for the banks to hold such property. The rights of the
banks to occupy, use, and operate such property are unclear in
Saudi Arabia due to lack of precedent. In current practice,
banks avoid exercising their rights to occupy, use, and operate
property in Saudi Arabia. Rather, banks are inclined to sell the
marhoun and apply the proceeds of such sale to the indebtedness
due the banks. However, the Shari'ah63 and other elements of
Saudi Arabian law64 contemplate that banks may hold the prop-
erty for some time prior to a sale, whereupon they will have re-
sponsibility for the safekeeping of the marhoun during such pe-
riod, and that the banks may apply the proceeds from the
marhoun to the reduction of their indebtedness. These princi-
ples, while existent in Saudi Arabia, are largely undeveloped.
Although there is no prescribed form of rahn in Saudi Ara-
bia, there are, based on general principles of the Shari'ah, vari-
60. Id. art 756.
61. Obtaining title would be an option available to the SC Banks in a New York or
English financing. Frequently, however, banks are reluctant to take title to a project for
reasons pertaining to such matters as lenders' liability issues or environmental law is-
sues. The istisna 'a-jara structure discussed in this Essay may involve a bank affiliate
taking title to improvements to real property for purposes of effecting a construction
financing, as was the case in the Maconda Park and Truman Park transactions.
62. See, e.g., Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah, supra note 30, arts. 756-61
63. See also Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah and Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Shar'iyah.
64. See, e.g., Banking Control Law of Saudi Arabia, art. 10, para. 2 (permitting bank
to have direct interest, as shareholder, partner, proprietor, or in another capacity, in
commercial, industrial, agricultural, or other enterprise, only if such interest accrues to
bank in settlement of debt from third party). The bank must liquidate such interest
within two years or such longer period as may be determined by SAMA. Id.
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ous requirements under Saudi Arabian law regarding specificity
of the description of the marhoun and the indebtedness secured
thereby. The rahn agreement must include an accurate designa-
tion and description of the marhoun. In the case of a rahn of real
property, the location and description of the real property, as
specified in the deed pertaining thereto, should be included. A
rahn of real property may also specify that it covers fixed assets
located on the land, such as buildings and immovables (fix-
tures) .65 The rahn will not be valid to the extent that it covers
property that does not exist at the time of the execution of the
rahn agreement. Despite the validity issue, the practice of SIDF
in Saudi Arabia is to include "after acquired" and "after con-
structed" property within the scope of the rahn.
The rahn agreement must also identify the debt being se-
cured thereby. There does appear to be agreement that a refer-
ence to the loan agreement pursuant to which the secured debt
is incurred is necessary and that the exact amount of the debt is
required to be specified in the agreement.66 There should be
separate detailed specifications of amounts constituting each ele-
ment of indebtedness-i.e., principal, interest, and other
amounts. In the event that the rahn agreements are reviewed for
compliance with the Shari'ah and are determined to secure inter-
est, the practice in Saudi Arabia is that such agreements would
be unenforceable only as and to the extent that they secure in-
terest. The remainder of the provisions would remain enforcea-
ble.
The rahn agreement should also include the terms under
65. Immovable property under the Shari'ah is defined as "any property that is sta-
ble and fixed so that it may not be moved or transported without damage." It includes
land, buildings, and trees. Also regarded as immovable property is movable property
placed, by its owner, on immovable property also owned by such owner for the purpose
of serving or exploiting such immovable property. Examples include doors and win-
dows in a building that, even though they are originally movable property, become part
of the immovable property in actual use. This is equivalent to the concept of fixtures.
It is not clear, however, how fixtures would be treated in the context of the Saudi Chev-
ron Project since the SC Project Company would be erecting facilities on land leased,
but not owned, by it.
66. Precision as to the amounts of interest or costs and expenses is very difficult, if
not impossible in many instances. The SC Security Documents do contain require-
ments that the SC Security Documents be "amended" from time to time as such
amounts become precisely determinable. These amendments are effected as part of
the draw-down mechanism in certain instances so as not to become unduly burden-
some as an administrative matter.
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which it may be exercised and the remedies of the mortgagee/
pledgee to occupy, use, and operate the marhoun; to sell such
assets; and, in each case, to apply the proceeds thereof to pay off
the debt secured. All other customary remedies should also be
set forth in greater detail than would be the case where New
York or English law is applicable.
It is important to note that Saudi Arabian law is somewhat
less developed as it pertains to pledges of certain personal prop-
erty, such as contract rights and permits, than it is with respect to
immovables, land, and other tangible assets. For example, it is
unclear whether and to what extent contract rights and permits
are "saleable" under the Shari'ah as applied in Saudi Arabia, and
thus whether they can be subject to a pledge. In addition, it is
more likely that a pledge of contract rights or permits would be
characterized as a power of attorney or agency relationship and
thus terminable by either party at will.
A final issue under Saudi Arabian law relates to the ability of
the banks to exercise remedies upon the occurrence of an event
of default that is not a payment event of default. The weight of
authority under Islamic jurisprudence, and in Saudi Arabia, ap-
pears to be that a party would be entitled to exercise remedies
for non-payment defaults. It is less certain, however, that the
banks would be entitled to accelerate the loans and exercise the
full panoply of remedies in such a situation; a Saudi Arabian
court or other adjudicatory authority, in applying equitable prin-
ciples, may limit the available remedies.
4. Rahn Documentation in the Saudi Chevron Project
As noted above, in order to address the applicable Shari'ah
precepts, the collateral security structure was developed by divid-
ing the available collateral into different categories. The general
categories of collateral and the related rahn and assignment
agreement are set forth in the following table:
Each type of SC Collateral was independently analyzed with
respect to all relevant factors, such as the nature of possession of
that type of SC Collateral. In the recitals and in the relevant
substantive provisions, each SC Security Document addresses
each necessary element of a permissible rahn with respect to
each category of SC Collateral. Those elements include market-
ability, value, and deliverability. A Bill of Possession was drafted
SHARJ'AH-COMPLIANT PROJECT FINANCE
AGREEMENT
General
General
General
General
General
General
General
Immovables, Real Property Interests,
and Related Contracts
Accounts
Accounts
Accounts
Contracts
Contracts
Proceeds, Available Receipts, and
Accounts Receivable
Intellectual Property
Approvals and Permits
General Personal Property
Equipment
General Intangibles, Chattel Paper,
Documents, and Instruments
Technology Licenses
Technology Licenses
Letters of Credit and Performance
Bonds
Letters of Credit and Performance
Bonds
Onshore Master Security Agreement
Onshore Common Agreement
Deed of Possession
Security Trust Deed
Offshore Security Deed
Announcement and Notification
Sign Language
Onshore Mortgage (Rahn)
Agreement
Onshore Pledge (Rahn) and
Assignment of Accounts
Offshore Accounts Assignment
Offshore Accounts Trust Deed
Consents
Onshore Pledge (Rahn) and
Assignment of Contracts
Onshore Pledge (Rahn) and
Assignment of Proceeds, Available
Receipts, and Accounts Receivable
Onshore Pledge (Rahn) and
Assignment of Intellectual Property
Onshore Pledge (Rahn) and
Assignment of Approvals
Onshore Pledge (Rahn) and
Assignment of Personal Property
Onshore Pledge (Rahn) and
Assignment of Equipment
Onshore Pledge (Rahn) and
Assignment of General Intangibles,
Chattel Paper, Documents, and
Instruments
Onshore Pledge (Rahn) and
Assignment of Technology Licenses
Offshore Assignment of Technology
Rights
Onshore Pledge (Rahn) and
Assignment of Letters of Credit and
Performance Bonds
Offshore Assignment of Letters of
Credit and Performance Bonds
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to address possession issues with respect of each type of SC Col-
lateral.
The Onshore Master Security Agreement and the Onshore
Common Agreement were designed to unify all the SC Collat-
eral and all rights and remedies in respect of each type of SC
Collateral. This allows the Security Agents, among other things,
to proceed against the entire SC Collateral package, if necessary,
and to coordinate rights and actions in respect of each type of
SC Collateral with all other rights and actions in respect of all
other types of SC Collateral. In addition, separate SC Security
Documents were drafted with respect to each individual type of
SC Collateral.67 Among other things, this allows the Security
Agents to proceed on a more limited basis where such an ap-
proach is appropriate. The Security Agents could then proceed
in respect of only a portion of the SC Collateral and minimize
interference with the ongoing operation of the project. Such
differentiation also allows the Security Agents greater flexibility
in choosing an enforcement entity in any given situation. Each
of the SC Security Documents incorporated elements intended
to insure that the relevant grants were irrevocable. The struc-
ture was designed so that the SC Collateral could be placed in
the possession (for Shari'ah purposes) of the Security Agents.
Each of the SC Security Documents incorporated traditional
representations, warranties, covenants, and events of default for
a limited recourse project financing. These were then tailored
specifically to incorporate Shari'ah requirements. Particular at-
tention was paid to keeping the SC Collateral free of competing
liens and maintaining the liens of the SC Security Documents,
including those for after-acquired or after-constructed property
67. Set-off rights in respect of bank accounts are one type of right applicable to
only a given type of collateral. Two sets of set-off rights applied in the Saudi Chevron
financing, one set under Saudi Arabian law and one set under English law, The SC
Security Documents were tailored to give effect to the relevant rights in each jurisdic-
tion.
Although there are no specific statutory provisions in Saudi Arabia relating to set-
off of debts, the rights of banks in Saudi Arabia to effect a set-off are broad. A set-off is
either compulsory by force of law, as in the case of state debts owed by individuals and
debts of individuals owed by the state, or by mutual agreement (hawala wa idhin bil
isteefa) that is irrevocable. The lender may not exercise the right of set-off unilaterally,
absent prior irrevocable consent in an agreement (which consent may be given at the
time of execution of the relevant SC Financing Agreement or SC Security Document).
Absent such an agreement, before setting-off any amounts, the bank has to hold the
funds and bring an action in court to allow it to exercise such right of set-off.
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and those loans made after the date of execution of the SC Se-
curity Documents (i.e., subsequent advances under the SC Fi-
nancing Agreements). Attention was also paid to placing posses-
sion of the SC Collateral with the Security Agents, minimizing
costs payable by the Security Agents as adlan and bailees of the
SC Banks. Furthermore, attention was paid to preventing the SC
Project Company from incurring indebtedness other than pursu-
ant to the SC Financing Agreements and the SIDF Loan Agree-
ment, and "bankruptcy proofing" the SC Project Company.
The SC Mortgage (Rahn) was drafted in conventional form
for recordation in Saudi Arabia, notwithstanding that it could
not be notarized and recorded under current practice. Substan-
tive modifications were made to the SC Mortgage (Rahn) and to
each of the SC Pledge (Rahn) Agreements to incorporate and
harmonize with other elements of the collateral security struc-
ture. The types of modifications that were considered for the SC
Mortgage (Rahn) included (a) requirements that the SC Project
Company (and the Royal Commission) make a notation on the
SC Site Lease providing adequate notice of the mortgagee rights
of the Onshore Security Agent, (b) recognition, in the SC Site
Lease, of the fact that the site is mortgaged in connection with
the financing, (c) obtaining the agreement of the Royal Com-
mission to make a notation on its deed pertaining to the mort-
gaged property to the effect that such property is subject to the
SC Mortgage (Rahn) in favor of the Onshore Security Agent,6"
and (d) obtaining a Consent from the Royal Commission that
contained an agreement that the Royal Commission would not
obtain a replacement deed for, or enter into any other lease with
respect to, the mortgaged property without the consent of the
Onshore Security Agent.
Various structural elements addressed the issue of providing
adequate actual notice to competing creditors of the existence
of the rahn in favor of the Security Agents for the benefit of the
SC Banks. For example, notices and signs were posted and are
to be maintained on the site and certain items of SC Collateral
to provide public notice of the rahn on the project and other
assets of the SC Project Company. In addition, to provide no-
tice, it is appropriate to publish a notice of rahn in the Official
68. The author is not aware of a transaction in which this type of recordation on
the deed has been made.
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Gazette (the Umm Al Qura). It is not clear, however, that the
Official Gazette would agree to publish such a notice. However,
other notices were provided by virtue of "tombstone" announce-
ments in various financial publications, including those directed
at potentially competing creditors, in order to give actual notice
of the existence of the security interests.
Each of the SC Security Documents has been structured
such that it is updated and amended (i) through the advance
request on each drawdown to reflect construction completed
and property acquired, since the date of the most recent previ-
ous update and (ii) periodically throughout the term of the fi-
nancing to reflect any property acquired by the SC Project Com-
pany since the most recent previous update. The property de-
scriptions are detailed. For example, the SC Mortgage (Rahn)
includes a precise description of the real property itself, the SC
Site Lease, and all "fixtures" and other items of property that
might, under Saudi Arabian law, be considered "immovable"
property. The descriptions are subject to periodic updating.
Each of the SC Security Documents also described with particu-
larity the indebtedness secured thereby. Additionally, a mecha-
nism was included in the advance request and at periodic inter-
vals to update each of the SC Security Documents to reflect con-
tinuing drawdowns and an increasing amount of indebtedness.
The remedies provisions of each of the SC Security Docu-
ments expressly permit the Security Agents to possess, use, and
operate the SC Collateral, including as an operating entity, and
to utilize the proceeds of operation to repay indebtedness and
other amounts due under the SC Financing Agreements. Other
customary remedies, including power of sale, were included in
each of the SC Security Documents in greater specificity than
would be the case under New York or English law. Given the
lack of clarity in Saudi Arabian law, each of the SC Security Doc-
uments clearly and unequivocally indicates that the Onshore Se-
curity Agent is entitled to exercise remedies, including remedies
other than judicial sale, upon the occurrence of events of default
that are not payment events of default. The SC Security Docu-
ments stipulate that non-payment remedies are integral to the
transaction, that the failure to perform with respect to non-mon-
etary matters is likely to have a material adverse effect on the
nature of the SC Collateral (indicating the limited recourse na-
ture of the financing), and that the existence of such non-pay-
SHARFAH-COMPLIANT PROJECT FINANCE
ment events of default was relied upon by the SC Banks in enter-
ing into the transaction.
Because of the provisions of the Shari'ah requiring that the
SC Banks maintain responsibility for expenses relating to preser-
vation of the rahn, among other reasons, the SC Facilities Agree-
ment contains covenants that require the SC Project Company,
as part of the project design, to include features that maximize
the value, utility, useful life, and secure status of the SC Collat-
eral. These provisions have the ancillary effect of minimizing
the cost exposure of the SC Banks. For example, the SC Project
Company is required to erect a fence, post the pertinent notices
of existence of the rahn in the construction contract, and is re-
quired to at all times maintain a security force, acceptable to the
SC Banks, that acts under the direction of the Onshore Security
Agent if an event of default has occurred. Other documentary
provisions were fashioned to require that the expenses in con-
nection with the "possessory" interest of the SC Banks be in-
cluded in various other agreements. In certain instances, the SC
Project Company is able to act as agent for the performance by
the Security Agents of their responsibilities in respect of the SC
Collateral. In addition, traditional reimbursement obligations
with respect to these expenses were included in the SC Facilities
Agreement.69
Each of the SC Security Documents also contains provisions
that lay the basis for asserting the jurisdiction of the different
Enforcement Entities in Saudi Arabia. And each SC Security
Document affords the Security Agents, on behalf of the SC
Banks, the widest possible latitude in choosing an Enforcement
Entity.
E. Dispute Resolution in the Saudi Chevron Financing
Decisions were taken in the Saudi Chevron financing, as
they are in any international financing, as to whether arbitration
should be a mandatory or a permissible remedy. Numerous
transactions have been structured to allow the financing banks
the choice of remedies, court actions or arbitration, as well as
the choice of forum. In some instances, the remedies vary with
the nature of the dispute-providing for court resolution as a
69. If enforcement is had before the SAMA Committee, for example, these provi-
sions are likely to be respected.
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possibility in some disputes and mandatory arbitration with re-
spect to other types of disputes. The provisions of the SC Secur-
ity Documents and the SC Financing Agreements for the Saudi
Chevron transaction contain complicated and carefully negoti-
ated remedies provisions incorporating a variety of mechanisms
for dispute resolution. On the whole, they allow the SC Banks,
at times through the Security Agents, maximum flexibility as to
choice of forum in Saudi Arabia (and outside Saudi Arabia,
where appropriate), and the provisions include Enforcement
Entity, court, and arbitral board options, although the range of
options varies with the type and subject matter of the dispute.
VI. A SHARIKAT MAHASSA-MURABAHA FINANCING
STRUCTURE: UTILITY POWER PROJECT
Islamic alternatives to the debt portion of the financing
have been developed and implemented. One example of a
transaction in which these alternatives have been implemented
is the project financing of a power plant expansion, and related
transmission facilities (collectively, "Utility Power Project"), for a
Saudi Arabian electric utility company ("Utility") in 1998. The
transaction may be characterized as a sharikat mahassa-murabaha
structure.
A sharikat mahassa under Saudi Arabian law70 is a joint ven-
ture, established pursuant to a memorandum of association or
other means, and of which third parties are unaware. Impor-
tantly, third parties have recourse only against joint venturers
with whom they have dealt so long as the existence of the joint
venture is undisclosed. If the joint venture is disclosed to third
70. Regulations for Companies, Royal Decree No. M/6 dated 22/3/1385 H. (cor-
responding toJuly 20, 1965), as amended by Royal Decree No. M/22 dated 30/7/1412
H. (corresponding to Feb. 3, 1992), and as otherwise amended [hereinafter REGULA-
TIONS FOR COMPANIES], Articles 40-47. See Majalat Al-Ahkam A1-Adliyah, supra note 30,
arts. 1045-1448 (addressing concepts of joint ownership, including joint ventures and
partnerships and the nature of, and rules pertaining to, undivided interests in assets).
A partnership is referred to as a musharaka, and there are many types of musharaka
arrangements. Id. See Ray, supra note 6, at 59-70 (discussing an overview of musharaka
arrangements); see also, Gobar Bilal, Business Organizations under Islamic Law: A Brief
Overview, in THIRD HARVARD ISLAMIC FORUM, supra note 1, at 83-89; MUHAMMAD
NEJATULLAH SIDDIQI, PARTNERSHIP AND PROFIT-SHARING IN ISLAMIC LAw (The Islamic
Foundation, 1985/1405 H); A COMPENDIUM OF LEGAL OPINIONS ON THE OPERATIONS OF
ISLAMIC BANKS: MURABAHA, MUDARABAH, AND MUSHARAKAH 219-61 (Yusuf Talal DeLo-
renzo, ed. & trans., 1997) [hereinafter DELoRENZO LEGAL OPINIONS] (containing a
good collection of fatawa regarding musharakah structures and transactions).
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parties, it is treated as a general partnership with respect to such
third parties. 71
A murabaha transaction is one in which a bank finances the
purchase of an asset by itself, purchasing that asset from a third
party and then reselling that asset at a profit to the bank client.
7 2
The bank is not permitted to sell the asset until the bank has
obtained ownership of the asset from the third party. The bank
may not obtain payment for the asset from the bank client prior
to receipt by the bank of the asset from the third party. The
minimum requirement for satisfaction of rules pertaining to re-
ceipt of the asset is that the bank be liable for the perishing or
loss of the asset.73 It is permissible for the bank client to enter
into a binding agreement stipulating that the bank client will
purchase the asset if the bank buys and receives that asset from a
third party. The bank may take security for the obligation of the
bank client to purchase the asset. The murabaha amount paya-
ble by the bank client must be a specified sum. The profit to the
bank may be calculated by the bank in its discretion, including
by reference to prevailing financial indices and with cognizance
of the time frame for effectuation of the transaction. However,
the amount of the murabaha obligation may not be increased af-
ter the bank client has assumed liability for payment of such
amount. The bank may appoint the bank client as its agent for
purposes of inspecting the asset to be purchased and accepting
delivery of such asset 74 so long as (a) the bank itself pays the
71. REGULATIONS FOR COMPANIES, supra note 70, art. 46.
72. See Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah, supra note 30, arts. 101-403 (addressing con-
cepts of sale); see also, Ray, supra note 6, at 38-59; VOGEL &I HAYES, supra note 2, at 117-
20, 140-43; Abdul-Rahman Abdullah bin Aqueel, Shari'ah Precautionary Procedures in
Murabaha and Istisna: A Practical Perspective, in SECOND HARVARD ISLAMIC FORUM, supra
note 2, at 127-30; Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo, Murabaha, Sales of Trust, and Money-value of
Time, in SECOND HARVARD ISLAIC FORUM, supra note 2, at 151-54 (discussing nature of
murabaha transactions and, as a general references); see, e.g., DELORENZO LEGAL OPIN-
IONS, supra note 70, at 1-168 (regardingfatawa pertaining to murabaha transactions).
73. The author has been involved in a number of transactions in which bank expo-
sure for such losses has been limited by specifying the period during which such loss
must occur or be determined and limiting damages as to their source and amount. The
specifications and limitations incorporated in these transactions have been approved by
different Shariah Boards of the involved parties.
74. See Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah, supra note 30, arts. 320-35 (pertaining to the
option to inspect, which provides a purchaser certain rights to inspect assets to be pur-
chased and to reject such assets in certain circumstances); id. arts. 336-55 (addressing
related option for defect). These doctrines also have significant application to con-
struction (istisna'a) and lease (ijara) arrangements. Other types of options that are
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purchase price to the third party, (b) the transaction passes
through a stage in which the bank is liable for loss or perishing
of the asset and the agency arrangement does not protect the
bank against such liability, and (c) the bank itself is not capable
of receiving and selling that asset. That agency relationship
need not be declared to the third party seller (or other persons),
so long as the lack of that declaration does not cause harm to
third parties.
The Utility Power Project transaction involved five parties:
the Utility; three banks providing financing ("PP Banks," one of
which is referred to as the "Administrative Bank");75 and an engi-
neering, procurement, and construction contractor ("EPC Con-
tractor"). The tenor of the financing was seven years, involving a
two-year construction period (without repayment) and a five-
year financing repayment period. The repayment schedule was
based upon sixty equal and consecutive installments commenc-
ing on the completion of construction. One of the PP Banks
provided fixed rate financing. The other two PP Banks provided
floating rate financing for the Utility Power Project. Thus, the
framework permits participation by both Islamic and conven-
tional banks. Collateral security arrangements were pursuant to
a rahn-adl structure.
The documentation for the sharikat mahassa-murabaha is
streamlined, involving only an engineering, procurement, and
construction contract, a sharikat mahassa (a type of joint venture
that is contemplated by the statutes of most Middle Eastern juris-
dictions, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab
Emirates) agreement, a murabaha agreement, and the desired
collateral security (rahn-adl) agreements.
To give effect to the financing arrangements, the Utility en-
tered into a conventional engineering, procurement, and con-
struction contract ("EPC Contract") with the EPC Contractor.
The Utility and the three PP Banks formed a sharikat mahassa
applicable in similar transactions are the contractual options (id. arts. 300-09), options
for misdescription (id. arts. 310-12), options as to payment (id. arts. 313-15), and op-
tions as to selection (id. arts. 316-19).
75. One of the three banks withdrew from the transaction because of interpretive
differences between its and the Shari'ah Board, on the one hand, and the Shari'ah
Board for the other two banks. These interpretive differences related to substantive
Shari'ah issues, the resolution of which directly affected the credit analysis of the trans-
action.
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("Sharikat Mahassa") (the Utility and each of the three PP Banks,
in their respective capacities as members of the Sharikat Mahassa,
is referred to as a "Member"). Each Member holds shares ("His-
sas") in the joint venture. The type of sharikat mahassa used for
the Utility Power Project is an "undisclosed sharikat mahassa,"
meaning that the PP Bank parties were not revealed to the EPC
Contractor or any other entity. This aspect of the transaction is
critical to the PP Banks because disclosure results in liability to
the PP Banks, whereas their liability is limited if there is no such
disclosure.7 6 Thus, the Utility covenanted not to disclose the ex-
istence of the Sharikat Mahassa or the identities of the PP Banks
and provided indemnification in the event of any such disclo-
sure. The Utility Power Project is owned by the Sharikat Mahassa,
with the EPC Contract being assigned to the Sharikat Mahassa
pursuant to valid assignment arrangements. The Utility acted as
the technical manager ("Technical Manager") of the Sharikat
Mahassa. The Technical Manager retained responsibility for all
technical and unforeseen liabilities.
Each of the PP Banks purchased Hissas by capitalizing the
Sharikat Mahassa in aggregate amounts equal to (a) upon initial
capitalization, in an amount equal to the cost of pre-existing de-
velopment work and (b) periodically upon completion of each
construction milestone, in an amount equal to the cost of com-
pletion of that milestone. To effect each purchase of Hissas in
connection with capital contributions, the Technical Manager
delivered a milestone completion certificate to the Administra-
tive Bank. Thereupon, the Administrative Bank provided a con-
tribution notice to each Member. Each Member made pro rata
contributions to the Sharikat Mahassa in accordance with its ini-
tial percentage interest. Transfers of Hissas were permitted be-
tween each of the Members at any time, but transfers to other
persons or entities were permissible only with the consent of the
Utility. The PP Banks were not entitled to any profits of the
Sharikat Mahassa, nor were they liable for any losses or liabilities
of the Sharikat Mahassa. Each of these elements of the structure
is subject to varying interpretations by Shari'ah Boards and to
mandatory and permissible statutory provisions and modifica-
tions. For example, certain Shari'ah Boards take the position
that a provision limiting the liabilities of the PP Banks with re-
76. REGULATIONS FOR COMPANIES, supra note 70, art. 46.
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spect to losses to the Sharikat Mahassa is void, while others take
the position that such a position invalidates the entire sharikat
mahassa agreement. Some Shari'ah Boards will approve the lack
of liability and loss sharing in limited sharikat mahassa arrange-
ments such as that pertaining to the Utility Power Project.
The murabaha portion of the financing structure involved
the sale of Hissas by the PP Banks to the Utility from time to
time. One of the more difficult Shari'ah issues in the transaction
focused on the timing of the sale of the Hissas. Some Shari'ah
Boards take the position that the sale of the Hissas may not oc-
cur until all construction of the Utility Power Project has been
completed and the project has been accepted as complete.
Other Shari'ah Boards take the position that a sale of Hissas may
occur upon completion of each milestone, and that the Hissas
that may be sold at the completion of such milestone are those
issued with respect to contributions used to finance construction
up to and including such milestone. Similarly, Shari'ah Boards
vary in their position with respect to when the murabaha agree-
ment relating to the sale of Hissas may be executed. Some
Shari'ah Boards permit execution of the murabaha agreement at
the inception of the financing transaction, others insist on exe-
cution only upon completion of the financing, and still others
permit the execution of multiple murabaha agreements upon
completion of each milestone. Frequently, the position of the
Shari'ah Board is factually dependent, focusing on the nature of
the construction activities and the contribution to value that has
been achieved by the time of completion of such milestone. Pay-
ment of the purchase price of the Hissas is delayed and effected
in accordance with the five-year repayment schedule for the fi-
nancing. There are also differences among Shari'ah Boards as to
the determination of the murabaha purchase price. Some
Shari'ah Boards require that the purchase price for the Hissas be
determined by reference to their net asset value (plus profit) at
the time of handover (which may be at completion of all con-
struction or completion of a specified milestone), while others
use a fair market value standard for purchase price determina-
tions.
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VII. AN ISTISNA 'A-IJARA FINANCING STRUCTURE: THE
MA CONDA PARK AND TRUMAN
PARK APARTMENTS
In June 2000, an Islamic construction financing structure
was implemented in a United States residential housing transac-
tion in Austin, Texas ("Maconda Park Project"). In April 2001,
that construction financing structure was implemented in a sec-
ond United States residential housing transaction in Largo, Ma-
ryland ("Truman Park Project")." The variations in the Truman
Park transaction were that (a) the structure was used to take out
an existing conventional construction loan, (b) an "orphan" spe-
cial purpose vehicle was introduced to enter into the two con-
struction contracts in the transaction, and (c) various aspects of
the structure were modified in an effort to reduce transactional
costs and expedite the documentation process. The structure
used in the Maconda Park and Truman Park transactions was
designed for project financings of all types and was then modi-
fied for the real estate transaction. The structure has been de-
signed to accommodate construction, mezzanine, and long-term
project financings, including take-outs of conventional loan
financings (as in Truman Park). The author has used modified
versions of this structure to implement similar financings in
Saudi Arabia. Implementation in the United States is substan-
tially more difficult as a result of, among other things, United
States bank regulatory requirements, liability allocation provi-
sions of United States environmental laws, and the standardiza-
tion of construction contracts in the United States.
The Maconda Park and Truman Park transactions may be
characterized as an "istisna'a-ijara" structure.7" An istisna'a is a
77. Insightful and creative contributions to, and many long hours in connection
with, the implementation and refinement of the istisna'a-ijara structure have been made
by Andrew M. Metcalf, Esq. and Jawad I. Ali, Esq., both associates at King & Spalding.
These transactions, and similar creative Islamic financings, could not have been
achieved without the entrepreneurial vision, patience, and persistence of the people at
each of the institutions involved, most notably those at Key Global Capital, Inc.,
KeyBank, National Association, Gulf Investment House, Fairfield Residential Properties,
Inc., and The Dolben Company, Inc. and their respective law firms. Particular acclaim
in this regard goes to James M. Godec, Esq. of Key Global Capital, Inc., Bader A. Al-Ali
of Gulf Investment House, the Shari'ah Supervisory Board of Gulf Investment House,
and W. Donald Knight, Jr., Esq. and Isam Salah, Esq., my partners at King & Spalding.
78. The transaction could have been structured as a pure istisna'a, in which the
bank enters into a construction contract (istisna'a) with the construction contractor
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type of sale of assets to be constructed or manufactured 79 ac-
cording to designated specifications and for a specific deter-
mined price. An ijara is a type of simple hire, or lease, of an
object or services.
Some of the relevant Shari'ah principles applicable to is-
tisna'a (construction) agreements are as set forth in this para-
graph.8 ° An istisna'a is a sale of assets to be constructed in which
a bank may finance the construction of permissible assets that
can be precisely determined by description and specifications.
Although the liability to pay for the construction, and deliver the
constructed assets, will be that of the bank providing the financ-
ing, the bank does not have to itself construct the assets. The
financing bank (sane') may contract with a third party (mustasne)
to construct the assets so long as this arrangement entails no
contractual obligations between the bank client that ultimately
desires to purchase the constructed assets8' and the construction
contractor. Payment by the bank client to the bank may be
and the bank client enters into an agreement with the bank to make payments for the
constructed asset on an installment basis. Alternatively, it could have been constructed
as an istisna'a-parallel istisna'a, in which (a) the bank client entered into a construc-
tion contract (istisna'a) with the bank pursuant to which the bank will construct, or
cause construction of, the asset and (b) the bank entered into a construction contract
(parallel istisna'a) with the construction contractor. The istisna'a-ijara structure was
used as an alternative to the foregoing for numerous reasons, including those pertain-
ing to United States bankruptcy considerations, the status of leases under state laws in
the United States, and flexibility of payment alternatives.
Kuwait Finance House implemented a financing lease (ijara) structure as part of
combined conventional-Islamic financing of the Equate Petrochemical Company pro-
ject in Kuwait in 1997. Mohammad S. AI-Omar, Islamic Project Finance: A Case Study of the
Equate Petrochemical Company, in THIRD HARVARD IsLAMIC FORUM, supra note 1, at 259-64
(describing financing for Equate Petrochemical Company project in Kuwait).
A range of legal and tax issues pertaining to cross-border Islamic transactions, par-
ticularly those implemented in the United States, are discussed in Isam Salah & W.
Donald Knight, Jr., Practical Legal and Tax Issues in Islamic Finance and Investment in the
United States, in SECOND HARVARD IsLAMIC FORUM, supra note 2, at 155-58. Tax aspects of
a cross-border lease (ijara) structure with structural aspects in common with the is-
tisna'a-ijara discussed in this Essay are discussed in Robert W. Toan, Cross Border jara:
A Case Study in the U.S. Taxation of Islamic Finance, in THIRD HARvARD IsLAMIC PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 1, at 191-197.
79. This Essay focuses on, and refers to, construction of assets, although the princi-
ples applicable to manufacturing of assets are identical.
80. See Majalat al-Ahkam Al-Shar'iyah, supra note 30, arts 338-92; see also Abdul-
Rahman Abdullah bin Aqueel, supra note 72, at 127-134.
81. The bank client would be the mustasne in the agreement between such bank
client and the financing bank if a parallel istisna'a structure were used, and the bank
would be the sane'.
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made up front or pursuant to periodic installment payments.
The istisna'a amount payable by the bank client to the bank, and
by the bank to the construction contractor, must be fixed and
known to both parties. The bank client is permitted to inspect
and supervise the construction activities to insure compliance
with the specifications and for other purposes. The bank client
may accept delivery of the constructed assets on behalf of the
bank.
It is also helpful to review a summary of certain relevant
Shari'ah principles relating to ijara (lease or hire) arrange-
ments.8 2 The ijara is a lease of an object or services involving the
transfer of the usufruct or manfa'a (the use of an object or the
services of a person) for a rent consideration where the nature
of the manfa'a must be precisely defined and the rental consider-
ation must be for a fixed value, whether payable in a lump sum
or installments,8" and the term of the ijara must be precisely de-
termined. The lease arrangements may be such that the lessee
acquires ownership upon the termination of the lease. Both the
rent and the term must be clearly ascertained and designated in
the ijara.8 4 The rent will commence immediately upon execu-
tion of the ijara if the manfa'a has sufficient economic value and
substance at that time, meaning that it can be, and is, put to the
use for which it is intended. 5 If it does not then have such eco-
nomic value and substance, the rent will commence when such
value and substance does exist. If the rent is reviewed during the
term of the ijara, each such review and any agreement (if
reached) changing the rent results in the creation of a new
lease. The rent must be specified as a fixed sum for each ijara
and the related rental term. However, the rent may escalate or
diminish during the rental term so longs as the amounts of such
escalation and/or decrease are specified and known to both par-
ties. 86 The lessor of assets is permitted to claim compensation
82. Majalat al-Ahkam Al-Shar'iyah, supra note 30, arts. 404-611.
83. Id. arts. 466-79.
84. See id. arts. 450, 454, 464, 484-96.
85. See id. arts. 443, 470-72, 477, 478. As noted in the text of this Essay, this is a
difficult structural and documentary issue in any project financing involving construc-
tion of an asset and is the subject of considerable debate among Shari'ah scholars.
86. There is substantial discussion of variable rate rental arrangements in Shari'ah-
compliant leases of equipment and real property. Many such leases make reference to
the London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR") as a base from which to compute peri-
odic rentals. Given the absence of reference rates based on Islamic financial instru-
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from the lessee for misuse of the leased assets, but may not make
claims in respect of ordinary wear and tear of the assets. The
lessor is responsible for structural maintenance of the assets and
this obligation may not be passed to the lessee pursuant to the
ijara.8 7 The lessor is entitled to rent as long as the lessee has the
enjoyment of the leased assets as specified in the ijara. If the
lessee does not have such enjoyment, as upon destruction or
condemnation of the manfa'a, the lessee may rescind the ijara
and any contrary provision will be invalid.
Against this background summary of relevant istisna'a and
ijara principles, there are significant course-of-business con-
straints that shape the structure of any such transaction. For ex-
ample, developers and general contractors in project financing
transactions (including real estate financings) have developed fi-
nancing structures and construction contracts that are relatively
standardized, both in terms of risk allocations and in terms of
documentation. This is particularly true in the United States
and Europe. Islamic Shari'ah precepts require risk allocations
and documentary terms that are quite at odds with standard
United States and European patterns. One of the greatest chal-
lenges in structuring the istisna'a-ijara transaction for the
Maconda Park and Truman Park Projects is related to putting
the various parties to the transaction in the same risk-allocated
position they would have occupied had the transaction been
structured as a conventional financing while still complying with
ments, most Shari'ah scholars allow the use of LIBOR as a reference rate. However,
most Shari'ah scholars object to the direct determination of rental rates by reference
solely to variable or floating rates in the body of an on-going Yara. See, e.g., M.A. Elgari,
Some Recurring Shari'ah Violations in Islamic Investment Agreements Used by International
Banking Institutions, in SECOND HARVARD ISLAMIC FORUM, supra note 2, at 153. Other
methods have been used to structure an ijara that have the practical effect of allowing
the implementation of a variable rate structure (one such structure being that used in
the Maconda Park Project and the Truman Park Project).
87. Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah, supra note 30, arts. 513-21 (pertaining to the con-
cept of an option for defect). See also, supra notes 78-9 and accompanying text. These
provisions, and the Shari'ah precepts implementing these principles, are a major factor
in structuring financing leases, particularly in the United States and Europe where fi-
nancing parties rely heavily on triple-net leasing concepts. This Essay refers to "struc-
tural maintenance" and similar concepts. These references are a shorthand, and one
often used by Shari'ah Boards as well, to those elements of structure, maintenance, and
integrity of the project that pertain directly to the benefits sought to be obtained
through leasing of the leased assets, and thus may include items beyond pure structural
maintenance. Those items will be determined on a case-by-case factual analysis of the
leased assets and the purposes of the iara.
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relevant Shari'ah principles. Then the parties must be satisfied as
to these risk allocations without prohibitive transactional cost.
A. General Structural Overview
The istisna'a-ijara structure discussed in this section is sum-
marized in diagrammatic form in Exhibit 1.
Exhibit 1
Istisna'a - IJara:
Overall Transaction KeyBank ....
(Without Security
Documentation) Financing
Construction
Managing nttorAremen j9
A real estate developer ("Developer") desired to develop and
construct a residential housing project. The Maconda Park Pro
ject, in Austin, Texas, was comprised of approximately 232 units
and Fairfield Residential Properties, Inc. ("Fairfield Residen-
tial") acted as the Developer. The Truman Park Project is com-
prised of approximately 284 units and is located in Largo, Mary-
land, and The Dolben Company, Inc. ("Dolben") was the Devel-
oper of that project. In connection with the development of
each of the Projects, the Developers, in each case through Key
Global Capital, arranged both equity investments and Islamic
"debt-equivalent" financing. The Islamic equity financing was
provided primarily by Gulf Investment House of Kuwait ("GIH")
in each transaction. Other equity participants were an affiliate
of Fairfield Residential and affiliates of Key Global Capital, in
the Maconda Park transaction and affiliates of Dolben and Key
Global Capital, in the Truman Park transaction (collectively, "Is-
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lamic Investors"). To implement the Maconda Park financing
arrangements, the Islamic Investors formed a special purpose
project company as an investment entity, the Maconda Park Lim-
ited Partnership ("Maconda Project Company"). In the Truman
Park transaction, an existing limited liability company, Truman
Park LLC ("Truman Project Company"), was reorganized in con-
nection with the Islamic financing and the infusion of the Is-
lamic investment. A Fairfiled Residential affiliate serves as the
"General Partner" of the Maconda Project Company, and a
Dolben affiliate serves as the "Managing Member" in the Tru-
man Park transaction. GIH and the Key Global Capital affiliates
invested as the limited partners and members in these transac-
tions. KeyBank, National Association ("KeyBank") provided fi-
nancing for each of the transactions8" through an affiliated en-
tity (each, an "Owner"). FF Development L.P., an affiliate of
Fairfield Residential, as the general contractor ("Maconda Gen-
eral Contractor"), is constructing the apartment buildings and
other improvements for the Maconda Park Project ("Maconda
Improvements") and Bovis Lend Lease, Inc. is acting as the gen-
eral contractor ("Truman General Contractor") for construction
of the apartments and other improvements ("Truman Improve-
ments") for the Truman Park Project. The Maconda Improve-
ments and the Truman Improvements are referred to as the "Im-
provements" and the Maconda General Contractor and the Tru-
man General Contractor are referred to as the "General
Contractors." The Truman Park transaction involved an entity
not present in the Maconda Park transaction, the "Construction
Arranger." The Construction Arranger is an "orphan" special
purpose vehicle that was created to enter into the Construction
Contract with the General Contractor and to enter into the Con-
struction (Istisna'a) Agreement with the Owner. The relevant
Owner is leasing and will lease the Maconda Park Project to the
Maconda Project Company, and is leasing and will lease the Tru-
man Park Project to the Truman Project Company, in each case
as described in this Essay. Each of the Project Companies also
acts as a managing contractor ("Managing Contractor") for the
construction and operation of the respective Projects. The
Maconda Project Company owns the site on which the Maconda
Park Project is being constructed ("Maconda Site") together
88. The "debt equivalent."
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with various easements, licenses, and other real estate interests
(collectively with the Maconda Site, "Maconda Premises"). Simi-
larly, the Truman Project Company owns the site on which the
Truman Park Project is being constructed ("Truman Site") to-
gether with various easements, licenses, and other real estate in-
terests (collectively with the Truman Site, "Truman Premises").
The Maconda Site and the Truman Site are collectively referred
to as the "Sites" and the Maconda Premises and the Truman
Premises are collectively referred to as the "Premises."
The primary documents for the construction and mini-
perm financing of each of the Maconda Park Project and the
Truman Park Project are, in each case:
(a). "SITE LEASE": The lease of each of the relevant Site (and
assignment of related easements) and the remainder of
each of the relevant Premises from the Project Company
for that Project, as the site lessors, to the relevant Owner,
as the site lessee, to allow such Owner to occupy such
Site and cause construction and leasing of the Improve-
ments thereon;
(b). "CONSTRUCTION (Istisna'a) Agreement": The Shari'ah-
compliant construction contract between the relevant
Owner and the Maconda General Contractor (in
Maconda Park) and between the relevant Owner and
the Construction Arranger (in Truman Park), in each
case for the construction of the Improvements for the
relevant Project, having attached thereto the Construc-
tion Terms (in Maconda Park) and the Construction
Contract (in Truman Park), including the specifications
and details of the cost of construction;
(c). "CoNSTRUCTION TERMS" and "CoNSTRUTION CONTRACT":
A standard construction contract 9  between the
Maconda General Contractor and the related Owner (in
Maconda Park) and between the Construction Arranger
and the Truman General Contractor (in Truman Park)
with respect to construction of the Improvements for the
relevant Project, including all specifications for such Im-
provements;
89. Such a standard construction contract might be the American Institute of Ar-
chitects Form A 11I, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor, and
Standard General Conditions and Special Conditions Relating Thereto, as was used in
the Truman Park transaction. In the Maconda Park transaction, the Construction
Terms were the General Contractor's own customary form of construction contract and
conditions.
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(d). "LEASE (Ijara)": A lease of the Improvements constitut-
ing part of each Project, and a sublease of each Premises
for such Project, from the Owner thereof to the each of
the relevant Project Company;90
(e). "PUT OPTION AGREEMENT": An agreement allowing each
Owner to cause the related Project Company to
purchase its related Project at various times and under
various circumstances at the election of such Owner;
(f). "CALL OPTION AGREEMENT": An agreement allowing each
Project Company to purchase its related Project from the
relevant Owner at various times and under various cir-
cumstances at the election of the such Project Company;
(g). "MANAGING CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT": An agreement
between each Owner and the relevant Project Company
pursuant to which the such Project Company performs
various construction and operation activities as the rep-
resentative of the related Owner; and
(h). "TAx MATTERS AGREEMENT": An agreement to clarify the
characterization of the transaction for United States tax
and other laws.
The mortgage (rahn), security agreement, and other collat-
eral security documentation, including guarantees of payment,
completion of construction, and environmental matters (collec-
tively "Security Documents"), are not discussed in this Essay. In
addition, there are various consents and similar documents be-
tween and among the parties to the transaction that allow for
assignment of documents in connection with the Security Docu-
ments and also make provision for the exercise of remedies in
various default scenarios and provide for damages in such scena-
rios.
In summary, in the Maconda Park transaction, the Devel-
oper and the Islamic Investors formed the Maconda Project
Company, with each such entity making equity contributions.
The Maconda Project Company, using such equity contributions
and the other financing amounts provided by KeyBank through
the related Owner as described herein, purchased, and holds ti-
tle to, the Maconda Site and the other portions of the Maconda
Premises. The Maconda Project Company leased the Maconda
90. The obligations of the Lessee under the Lease (Ijara) are evidenced by a Basic
Rent Note.
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Site and granted other rights to the remainder of the Maconda
Premises to the Owner pursuant to a Site Lease.
In the Truman Park transaction, the Developer had previ-
ously formed the Truman Project Company and had purchased
the Truman Site prior to the conversion of the conventional
construction loan to an istisna'a-ijara financing structure. The
Islamic Investors made equity contributions to the Truman Pro-
ject Company after restructuring of that company. The Truman
Project Company, using such equity contributions and the other
financing amounts provided by KeyBank through the Owner as
described herein, converted the conventional loan financing to
an Islamic financing and undertook construction of the Truman
Park Project. The Truman Project Company leased the Truman
Site and granted other rights to the remainder of the Truman
Premises to the related Owner pursuant to a Site Lease.
KeyBank provided and provides financing for both Projects
by making amounts available to separate affiliates of KeyBank,
the respective Owners. The Owner of the Maconda Park Project
disbursed the financing amounts into the Maconda Park Project
by making payments with respect to acquisition of the Maconda
Premises. On a periodic basis, the Owners of each of the
Projects will disburse further amounts with respect to construc-
tion of the Improvements pursuant to the Construction (Is-
tisna'a) Agreements. Each Owner holds legal title to the Im-
provements constituting a part of its related Project. In the
Maconda Park transaction, the Owner is causing the General
Contractor to construct the Improvements pursuant to the Con-
struction (Istisna'a) Agreement between such entities. The Con-
struction (Istisna'a) Agreement incorporates the General Con-
tractor's conventional construction contract, the Construction
Terms, including specifications and milestone payment provi-
sions, and also modifies the Construction Terms to comply with
applicable Shari'ah precepts. In the Truman Park transaction,
an "orphan" special purpose entity was established to enter into
the Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement with the Owner and to
enter into the Construction Contract with the General Contrac-
tor. The Construction Contract is incorporated in, and modi-
fied in accordance with Shari'ah precepts by, the Construction
(Istisna'a) Agreement. The use of this entity resulted in the Gen-
eral Contractor being able to use its customary Construction
Contract without adaptation to the Islamic structure, isolated the
2001] 1245
1246 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:1184
General Contractor from the Islamic transaction, and resulted in
substantial savings in transactional costs and implementation
time. Each Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement contains the
"lending and disbursement half' of a conventional loan agree-
ment, including conditions precedent to funding.
Each of the Owners is leasing and will lease its constructed
Improvements, is subleasing and will sublease its related Site,
and has grant rights to the remainder of the relevant Premises to
the related Project Company in its capacity as lessee under each
Lease (Ijara) (in their respective capacities thereunder, each
Owner is referred to as the "Lessor" and each Project Company
is referred to as the "Lessee"). The Lease (Ijara) is the primary
financing document for the transaction, particularly as regards
repayment of financing amounts through rent mechanisms,
events of default, remedies, and covenants.
Each Project Company will be permitted to purchase the
Project that it is leasing on a date elected by such Project Com-
pany pursuant to the Call Option Agreement. The provisions of
the Call Option Agreement include the voluntary prepayment
concepts of a conventional loan agreement. Similarly, each
Owner will be permitted to sell its Project to the related Project
Company in certain circumstances, such as defaults under the
Lease (Ijara), pursuant to the Put Option Agreement. The pro-
visions of the Put Option Agreement are akin to the mandatory
prepayment provisions of a conventional loan agreement. As a
general rule, put option agreements are disfavored under the
Shari'ah. As a result and despite the name of the agreements,
the Put Option Agreement and the Call Option Agreement were
structured to comply with the many Shari'ah precepts applicable
to agreements of sale and purchase.
Each Owner, as the holder of title to its related Improve-
ments and lessee and grantee of the related Premises, and each
Project Company, as the Managing Contractor for the related
Project, entered into a Managing Contractor Agreement. Pursu-
ant thereto, the Managing Contractor supervises construction
activities under the related Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement,
inspects the related Project as it is being constructed, and upon
completion of milestones accepts that Project on behalf of the
related Owner. The Managing Contractor also maintains the re-
lated Project to the extent that its Owner does not do so under
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the Lease (Ijara). Applicable Islamic Shari'ah precepts permit a
managing contractor or agent to act in this capacity.
Each Owner, each Project Company, and other entities also
entered into the Tax Matters Agreement, which acknowledges
the transaction as a financing for purposes of U.S. tax law. This
acknowledgment allows each Project Company to take economic
advantage of various expense and depreciation provisions of the
U.S. tax law (such as allowing the payment of certain amounts to
offshore investors without withholding tax) and other U.S. fed-
eral and state laws pertaining to the liability exposure of finan-
ciers (such as environmental liability laws).
B. Structural and Documentary Shari'ah Issues
1. Site Lease
Each Site has been made available to the related Owner, as
the site lessee, pursuant to a Site Lease from the relevant Project
Company, as the site lessor (in such capacity, "Site Lessor"), in
consideration for the payment of site lease rent ("Site Rent").
The Site Lease is unusual, considered from the vantage of a cus-
tomary project financing or real estate financing in the United
States. The differences from a conventional ground lease relate
to applicable Islamic Shari'ah precepts and to risk allocations
that must be made to accommodate use of the istisna'a-ijara
structure in the United States with parties that are accustomed
to a specified pattern of risk allocations. As examples of the
structural differences from customary ground leases, in the is-
tisna'a-ijara structure, the Site Lessor, as owner of the Site, re-
tained responsibility for environmental liabilities, the state and
condition of the Site, unforeseen circumstances pertaining to
the relevant Site, compliance with legal requirements by the
Lessee, and payment of taxes and other amounts, among other
things. In addition, the Site Lessor has the obligation to prevent
unlawful use of the Site, unlawful conditions on the relevant
Site, and other uses of that Site that may give rise to damages or
liabilities pertaining to use or occupation of that Site, including
compliance with environmental laws. The Site Lessor also pro-
vided indemnities to the related Owner/Site Lessee and other
indemnitees in respect of such matters.
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2. Construction (Istisna'a) Contract; Construction Terms;
Construction Contract; Total Construction Cost
The Maconda Park Project is being and will be constructed
by the Maconda General Contractor pursuant to the Construc-
tion (Istisna'a) Agreement with the relevant Owner. The Con-
struction Terms were negotiated by the Maconda Project Com-
pany with the Maconda General Contractor. The Construction
Arranger will cause the construction of the Truman Park Project
(by the Truman General Contractor) pursuant to its Construc-
tion (Istisna'a) Agreement with the Owner, which incorporates
the Construction Contract between the Construction Arranger
and the Truman General Contractor. The Construction Con-
tract for the Truman Park Project was negotiated by the Truman
Project Company with the Truman General Contractor." The
Maconda General Contractor (in Maconda Park) and the Con-
struction Arranger (in Truman Park) agreed in the Construction
(Istisna'a) Agreement to construct and deliver the relevant Pro-
ject to its Owner, who has legal title to the related Improve-
ments. The total cost for construction of each Project pursuant
to the Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement is referred to as the
"Total Construction Cost" of that Project.
Payments under each Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement
are made in the same manner, on the same schedule and subject
to the same conditions that advances would be made in connec-
tion with a conventional construction financing arrangement.
Those conditions precedent that would be conditions precedent
to the initial advance and all subsequent advances in a conven-
tional construction financing are conditions precedent to the
making of payments under each Construction (Istisna'a) Agree-
ment. Conditions precedent for subsequent advances are ad-
dressed through the construction payment request mechanism,
which, in turn, incorporates a milestone completion payment
mechanism. Thus, for example, each General Contractor, the
Construction Arranger, and the Managing Contractor will pre-
91. The customary practice is that each construction contractor (i.e., each General
Contractor in the istisna'a-ijara transaction) dictates the form of construction contract
that it uses. Many construction contractors use a widely recognized standard form
(such as those of the American Institute of Architects, which was used, in modified
form, by Bovis Lend Lease, Inc. as the General Contractor in the Truman Park transac-
tion). Others use their own forms, which are precisely tailored to that individual con-
struction contractor, such as in the Maconda Park transaction.
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pare payment requests and milestone completion certificates
that will resemble advance requests in a conventional construc-
tion financing. The obligation of each Owner to make such pay-
ments will be conditioned upon compliance with performance
of matters relevant to the payment request.
In the event that a payment request cannot be given due
failure of a Project Company to satisfy one or more of the rele-
vant conditions precedent, the General Contractor (in Maconda
Park and Truman Park) and the Construction Arranger (in Tru-
man Park) will continue to be entitled to pursue their respective
rights to payment, but only against the relevant Project Com-
pany. However, it will have to do so under the Managing Con-
tractor Agreement and certain other documents. The amount
of damages that a General Contractor and the Construction Ar-
ranger will be entitled to collect will be limited to amounts ob-
tainable from the relevant Project Company and other amounts
payable through performance bonds, warranties, completion
bonds, insurance proceeds, and similar arrangements. Neither
of the General Contractors nor the Construction Arranger is en-
titled to pursue remedies against an Owner for failure to per-
form a funding condition.
3. Lease (Ijara)
The Lease (Ijara) is the primary financing document on the
repayment side of the transaction. Each Project Company, as
the Lessee, repays the financing amounts made available by its
related Owner through the payment of periodic basic rent ("Ba-
sic Rent"). Commencing upon an agreed date, the Lessee will
be required to begin paying Basic Rent in installments over the
agreed rental period ("Rental Term").92 The Lease (Ijara) was
executed at the same time as the other financing documents, but
cannot become fully effective at such time due to a Shari'ah prin-
ciple that prohibits the payment of rent for an asset until that
asset has sufficient economic value and sufficiency for Shari'ah
purposes-i.e., until the asset can be, and is, put to the intended
use. Different Shari'ah Boards take different positions as to
92. The documentation for each of the Projects is for a construction financing. As
such, the Rental Term is likely to be in the range of one to four years, with a permanent
long-term financing take-out contemplated during, or at the end of, such period. The
structure could be extended to cover a long-term financing of either Project. In other
transactions, a long-term lease (ijara) has been used.
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when an asset has sufficient economic value and sufficiency.
This determination is dependent upon the specific facts of the
project being considered. For example, each of the Projects is
comprised of numerous buildings with many units in each build-
ing. Construction commences with the first building and moves
in sequential fashion through each of the buildings. As a result,
the first building will be completed and occupied prior to com-
pletion of construction on the last building. Rental activities
with respect to the buildings will thus commence substantially
before the entire project is constructed.9"
Under one of the strict interpretations of relevant Islamic
principles, Shari'ah Boards may allow an ijara to become effec-
tive only on a building-by-building basis as construction nears
completion. Such an interpretation might require the use of
nine lease (ijara) agreements (assuming eight buildings and
common property), and nine construction (istisna'a) agree-
93. Significant construction or expenditure may be completed or made at the time
of entering into, or very shortly after execution of, the Lease (jara) because approxi-
mately 20-25% of the construction costs may already have been incurred and related
activities completed. The 20-25% represents the equivalent of the equity investment in
the project that must have been spent on approved expenditures before the Owner
thereof will make payment advances under the Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement. As
a result, the related Site will have been acquired, much of the site preparation work may
be completed, and the related Premises may already contain sewers, roads, water, and
other infrastructural improvements. Some Shari'ah Boards have indicated that this de-
gree of expenditure upon a project is sufficient to cause the Basic Rent provisions to
become effective because the value of the related Premises will be substantially, and
sufficiently, increased by this time. Further, and as noted in the Lease (Ijara), construc-
tion of certain blocks and segments of the Improvements for each Project will be com-
pleted before completion of other blocks or segments. Certain blocks and segments
will have considerable lease value, and units will actually be rentable, prior to comple-
tion of other blocks and segments. Thus, significant rental income will already be gen-
erated prior to completion of the entire Project in either financing transaction. This,
in turn, allows full effectuation of all provisions of the Lease (jara) at a relatively early
time.
Although the determination of sufficient economic value and sufficiency of status
to permit the intended use are significant and vexing Shari'ah issues, they are not diffi-
cult issues in a practical sense in projects such as the Maconda Park Project and the
Truman Park Project. This is because the transaction is a construction financing in
which no Basic Rent is payable during the construction period, i.e., for approximately
two or two and one-half years from commencement of the financing. Construction is
complete for the entire Project by the end of that period. Although no Basic Rent is
payable during that period, most construction financings include a feature that capital-
izes interest (in a conventional financing) or profit (in an Islamic financing) during the
construction period. The capitalization method used in each Project, and in similar
projects, is particularly complex and has received the approval of various Shari'ah
Boards. That capitalization method is not discussed in this Essay.
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ments, to provide financiers with required certainties of repay-
ment and perfected security interests over all funds advanced in
respect of construction.94 This, in turn, might require nine fil-
ings under local law of memoranda of leases, mortgages, and
other security agreements. Filing and recordation fees and title
insurance costs alone might make such an approach prohibi-
tively expensive. Such a transaction would be complicated and
difficult to implement. Other Shari'ah Boards acknowledge the
practical difficulties of multiple filings of mortgages and have
taken a pragmatic view of the financing process in Europe, the
Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the United States. Those
Shari'ah Boards have allowed a single lease (ijara) to become ef-
fective as to all provisions other than the Basic Rent provisions at
the inception of the transaction. The Boards have allowed the
Basic Rent provisions to become effective at the time that mar-
keting and rental activities commence with respect to any part of
the project or some other similar date that relates to commence-
ment of binding activities in respect of rent generation. The
date of effectiveness of the Basic Rent provisions ("Full Effectua-
tion Date") for the projects is then determined in accordance
with relevant Shari'ah principles as specified by the Shari'ah
Board.
The GIH Shari'ah Board that considered the structure of,
94. The author has worked on transactions in which multiple leases were used, one
for each phase of the project. This approach permits different leases, and financing
arrangements, for different aspects of construction, and allows each lease to be tailored
to a different intended use. Given that the Shari'ah precept focuses on the intended
use, effectuation of the leases under Shari'ah precepts can be obtained at an earlier
point in the overall financing transaction, and the various leases can be closely tailored
to construction milestone completion and funding.
The author is presently working on an istisna'a-ijara transaction that poignantly
raises the effect of factual variation on the Shari'ah determination of full effectuation of
the lease. The transaction involves the acquisition of a large farm. An Islamically ac-
ceptable joint venture has been formed to subdivide the farmland, obtain certain per-
mits for construction and related activities, and construct infrastructure (roads, sewers,
lighting, and the like). Each parcel will be sold off to another residential or commer-
cial developer, or a commercial enterprise, which will construct the housing or com-
mercial facilities for that specific parcel. The entire purpose of the joint venture is so
limited. Clearly, the intended construction activities are limited, and substantial eco-
nomic value and sufficiency, especially when considered from an "intention" perspec-
tive, is obtained at a very early stage in the business cycle. Another factor affecting
substantial economic value and sufficiency issues, particularly in the United States, is
the fact that obtaining a permit or zoning approval, without more, will frequently sub-
stantially enhance the value and sufficiency of the land (without regard to any physical
construction).
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and documentation for, the Maconda Park Project and the Tru-
man Park Project was intimately involved in defining and imple-
menting the mechanism for determining and implementing the
Full Effectuation Date. The Board took a rigorous position with
respect to the determination of sufficient economic value and
sufficiency. However, based upon the factual configuration of
each Project and its development, the Board also allowed each
of the transactions to be structured using a single Lease (Ijara), a
single Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement, and a single set of Se-
curity Documents. In each Project, if the Full Effectuation Date
has not occurred by a stated date, then the Owner may cause the
relevant Project Company to purchase that Project in accor-
dance with the Put Option Agreement.
Pursuant to the Lease (Ijara), each Owner, as the Lessor,
leases its Improvements, and subleases the related Site, to the
relevant Project Company, as the Lessee. The Improvements
and the Site will be leased and subleased, respectively, as-is,
where-is, as the same is constructed or otherwise provided to the
Owner.95 Property becomes subject to the Lease (Ijara) on a
continuous on-going basis as construction is completed and each
Project is inspected and accepted by the relevant Managing Con-
tractor. Except as prohibited by applicable Shari'ah precepts,
the Lease (Ijara) is a triple net lease, with all costs associated
with the use and operation of the relevant Project being payable
by the related Lessee,96 and with broad indemnity provisions
similar to those found in triple-net financing leases, although
such indemnity provisions must themselves be modified to com-
ply with Shari'ah precepts.97 Each Lessee has and will have the
right to operate and use its Project and the obligation to main-
tain that Project (except, for example, that structural mainte-
nance will remain the responsibility of the Owner as the Lessor).
The Basic Rent payable under the Lease (Ijara) has been
structured to include a profit to the Lessor. The profit amount
is determined on the basis of a weighted group of LIBOR refer-
95. As noted in Section VII(B) (6), a Managing Contractor, among other things,
supervises construction activities, inspects construction of each Project on an on-going
basis, accepts that Project, and provides for maintenance (including major and struc-
tural maintenance) pursuant to the Managing Contractor Agreement.
96. Certain modifications to the triple net lease concept that are necessary for
compliance with Shariah precepts are discussed below.
97. See M.A. Elgari, supra note 86, at 151-54.
SHARIAH-COMPLIANT PROJECT FINANCE
ence rates for different time periods and advance allocations
("Lessor Profit")."8 The Basic Rent is due and payable on the
leased assets (i.e., the relevant Improvements) commencing
upon the Full Effectuation Date or a later scheduled repayment
commencement date thereafter. The Basic Rent payable at any
given time is a pro rata portion of the Total Construction Cost
paid to the Maconda General Contractor or the Construction
Arranger, as appropriate, at such time, plus the Lessor Profit on
such amount. Thus, the Basic Rent will be redetermined on a
time schedule (for example, a monthly basis) in lock step with
the payments by the Owner to the General Contractor (in
Maconda Park) and the Construction Arranger (in Truman
Park). This arrangement keeps the Basic Rent Payments in har-
mony with the on-going partial payments in respect of the Total
Construction Cost and the increase in the portion of each Pro-
ject that has been completed, inspected, and accepted. The
mechanism for achieving this recalculation of Basic Rent, which
involves change orders accepting completed work, has been
structured so as to comply with relevant Islamic Shari'ah precepts
and does not involve an uncertain rent amount under such
precepts.99 Change orders for each transaction will become ef-
fective only when agreed upon by the General Contractor, the
Construction Arranger (in Truman Park), the Managing Con-
tractor, the Owner, and the Lessee for that transaction. Part of
such approval process will include an addition of such items to
the leased asset base under the Lease (Ijara) in the relevant pe-
riod (i.e., for future periods).
The standard supplemental rent provision is used to pro-
vide for payment of costs of use and operation of each Project
above and beyond the Basic Rent ("Supplemental Rent"). Sup-
plemental Rent includes taxes, impositions, third-party pay-
ments, and indemnity payments. Pursuant to the sublease ar-
rangement for each Site under the relevant Lease (Ijara), the
Lessee is responsible to pay the Site Rent directly to the relevant
Site Lessor. Basic Rent, Supplemental Rent, and Site Rent for
98. See id. at 151-54.
99. See, e.g., DowJones Islamic Market Indexes, at http://indexes.dowjones.com/
djimi/imiinvest.html; Islamic Business & Finance Network ("IBFNET"), at http://is-
lamic-finance.net/islamic-equity/equityl.html; Abdul Hamid, Investing in Equities: Some
Issue from the Islamic Perspective, in THIRD HARVARD ISLAMIC FORUM, supra note 1, at 91-
101.
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each Project are collectively referred to as "Rent" for that Pro-
ject.
In the event that the Lease (Ijara) is terminated during the
Rental Term of a Project, and in a case where no long-term fi-
nancing takes out the construction financing pursuant to the
Lease (Ijara) for that Project, all Rent due to such date of termi-
nation or otherwise permissible under relevant Shari'ah precepts
will be immediately due and payable. In addition, the relevant
Owner will be entitled under the Put Option Agreement to
cause the relevant Project Company to purchase its Project at
such time. 0 0
Various Shari'ah precepts pertaining to leases resulted in the
Lease (Ijara) being structured differently from customary
United States leases. For example, under the Shari'ah, a lessor
must retain responsibility for structural maintenance of leased
property. The obligation for structural maintenance cannot be
passed to the lessee under an ijara. Similarly, some Shari'ah
Boards require the lessor to retain the obligation to provide
100. The form of lease (ijara) that served as the structural basis for the Lease
(Ijara) has been used in numerous Islamic financings and the adjustment mechanism
has been approved by several Shari'ah Boards. Analytically, the Lease (Ijara) can be
thought of as a lease for a specified period (for example, one month). The Basic Rent
payable under the Lease (Ijara) is determined by dividing the absolute amount of the
Total Construction Cost paid to the first day of such month by the overall payment
period, and then adding the applicable Lessor's Profit. Analytically, the Lease (Ijara)
will then terminate on the last day of such month unless the parties agree to extend for
another period (say, another month). If the Lease (Ijara) is so extended by virtue of a
new and otherwise identical lease, the Basic Rent is recalculated to increase by the
amount of Total Construction Cost advanced to the first day of such second month,
and, again the weighted reference rate analysis is applied to determine the applicable
Lessor's Profit for the new lease. This process is repeated with respect to each subse-
quent rental period. Payment of some or all of the Rent is deferred during the con-
struction period so long as there is a continuous and contiguous series of leases.
If the Lease (jara) is not renewed at the end of any month or other rental period,
the Lease (jara) terminates and the total amount of Rent accrued to such date be-
comes immediately due and payable and can no longer be deferred. Pursuant to the
Put Option Letter, the relevant Owner is entitled to cause the relevant Project Com-
pany to immediately purchase its Project in its then-existing state and condition for a
specified amount.
In practice, the Lease (Ijara) is written such that it automatically renews each pe-
riod (for example, each month) unless there is a cancellation. These, and other struc-
tural elements, are designed to minimize the administrative and financial burden on
the parties (especially the Lessee) and streamline the renewal and recalculation process
and to avoid various complications of various United States laws, including bankruptcy
laws, mortgage recordation laws, and recordation and taxation requirements in differ-
ent jurisdictions.
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property casualty insurance. The Lease (Ijara) for each of the
Projects was structured in compliance with these, and other simi-
lar, Shari'ah precepts.
The events of default in the Lease (Ijara) are those that are
customary for a lease of such type, and include most of the
events of default usually found in a conventional construction
financing. Certain other events constitute events that permit the
purchase and sale of each Project under the related Put Option
Agreement. As with a conventional construction financing, an
event of default will allow the Lessor a broad choice of remedies,
including the ability to terminate the Lease (Ijara) and related
arrangements, to sell the related Project, and to collect the
purchase price in respect of such sale. The remedies provisions
have been structured to reflect those available to a lender in a
conventional loan financing. The overall structure also allows
each Owner to exercise its right under certain of the financing
documents to suspend or cease making payments to the General
Contractor (in Maconda Park) and the Construction Arranger
(in Truman Park) upon the occurrence of events of default
under those documents, assign rights under the Lease (Ijara)
(and/or related documents) to the related General Contractor
in certain circumstances, and be relieved of further liability to
the General Contractor, the Construction Arranger, and the
Lessee.
4. Put Option Agreement and Call Option Agreement
In order to allow each Project Company to prepay the fi-
nancing and obtain ownership of its Project, each Owner and its
related Project Company entered into a Call Option Agreement.
The applicable provisions of each Call Option Agreement basi-
cally reflect the optional prepayment provisions of a conven-
tional loan agreement, with certain limitations to preclude ad-
verse bankruptcy and other undesirable results.
In addition, to allow the Owner to exit the transaction in
certain cases (such as defaults by the Lessee and certain in-
stances of illegality), each Owner and its related Project Com-
pany entered into a Put Option Agreement. The Put Option
Agreement allows the Owner to sell its Project to the related Pro-
ject Company. Cases in which such sale will be permitted in-
clude defaults under the Lease (Ijara) or the other financing
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documents, including the failure of the Project Company to
make payments or to accept any property that is required to be
subject to the Lease (Ijara) or the other Project Documents, ter-
mination of the Lease (Ijara), the Site Lease, the Managing Con-
tractor Agreement, and certain other agreements prior to the
last day of the stated Rental Term, certain agreed termination
events, illegality, and certain termination events relating to ex-
cess payments in respect of the Project. There are significant
Shari'ah issues with respect to any put option as put options are
generally considered to be executory agreements that are cancel-
able by either party to the options. With the assistance of the
GIH Shari'ah Board, the Put Option Agreement (and the Call
Option Agreement) for the Maconda Park and the Truman Park
transactions were structured to comply with Shari'ah precepts ap-
plicable to valid sale and purchase agreements.
Numerous Shari'ah precepts are applicable to irreparable
damage or destruction of assets and to the application of insur-
ance, condemnation, or similar payments that are received in
respect of destroyed assets. These precepts require termination
provisions to be structured quite differently than conventional
construction and project financings. However, within the ambit
permitted by applicable Shari'ah precepts, the transaction must
be structured to insure full repayment of all financing amounts
and put the financiers in the same position they would occupy in
a conventional financing. In the Maconda Park and Truman
Park transactions, upon destruction or total condemnation of
the relevant Project, the Lease (Ijara) will terminate immediately
as required by Shari'ah precepts, the Rent then due and payable
(but not future rents) will be paid to the Lessor, the related Pro-
ject Company will be required to purchase its Project and pay
the purchase price therefore, and the proceeds of such insur-
ance, condemnation, and other payments will be applied to the
payment of the purchase price for that Project (and related
transfer costs) and any excess thereafter remaining will be paid
over to the relevant Project Company. Difficult issues arise in
connection with the determination of the relevant purchase
price as Shari'ah principles generally restrict payments to the fair
market value of the Projects after the event of destruction or
condemnation.
Upon any purchase by a Project Company of its Project, the
Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement (and related rights and
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agreements) will be assigned to that Project Company and that
Project Company will assume all of the obligations of the related
Owner thereunder. Similarly, all insurance policies and warran-
ties will be assigned and assumed such that the Project Company
is afforded complete ownership rights.
5. Security Documents
The obligations of the Maconda Project Company and the
General Contractor, in the Maconda Park transaction, and the
Truman Project Company and the Construction Arranger, in the
Truman Park transaction, are secured by the related Security
Documents, which include a mortgage (rahn) on, and other se-
curity interests in, the relevant Site, the cash flows of such enti-
ties, including in respect of operation of the relevant Project,
and any other assets of such entities. Those Security Documents
also include various guarantees of the Developer or others that
would be required by a bank in a conventional construction fi-
nancing (such as general guarantees, completion guarantees,
and environmental guarantees). These documents are provided
to, or assigned for the benefit of, the relevant Owner and
KeyBank in the Maconda Park and Truman Park transactions.
6. Managing Contractor Agreement
As previously noted, Islamic Shari'ah precepts require an
Owner to retain obligations in respect of structural maintenance
of its Improvements. Other Shari'ah precepts pertain to inspec-
tion of property being constructed, responsibility for latent de-
fects, acceptance of leased (or purchased) assets, and operation
and maintenance of leased assets. In order to achieve, as closely
as possible, the risk allocations found in a conventional financ-
ing, it was necessary to structure the transaction in reliance upon
a body of Shari'ah principles that allows an owner of property to
contract with other entities to perform activities on behalf of
such owner. Generally, these principles pertain to concepts of
agency and contracting for services under the Shari'ah. Those
principles also incorporate certain of the doctrines of Western
jurisprudence applicable to the retention of independent con-
tractors to perform activities on behalf of a property owner.
It is permissible under applicable Shari'ah precepts for an
Owner to retain a Managing Contractor to perform certain of
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the activities retained by that Owner under the Lease (Ijara) and
accept responsibility for them in connection with the perform-
ance of its duties. The Maconda Park and Truman Park transac-
tions were each structured to allow the Owner to hire and ap-
point the related Project Company as the Managing Contractor
for the primary purposes of (a) supervising and managing the
design, engineering, and construction of the relevant Project by
the General Contractor (and the Construction Arranger, in Tru-
man Park), (b) inspecting that Project, (c) accepting delivery of
that Project, (d) enforcing the rights of the Owner as against the
related General Contractor and the Construction Arranger, and
(e) operating and maintaining that Project, all pursuant to the
Managing Contractor Agreement.
This Managing Contractor Agreement has been structured
such that the Managing Contractor bears the risks (i) of con-
struction of the relevant Improvements in compliance with spec-
ifications and other terms and conditions of the Construction
(Istisna'a) Agreement (including the Construction Terms or
Construction Contract, as applicable) to the extent permissible
applying Shari'ah precepts pertaining to the options of inspec-
tion and defect, and to precepts applicable to supervision and
acceptance, and (ii) for maintaining the structure of the relevant
Project and certain related matters throughout the Rental Term.
The arrangement facilitates immediate and continuous inspec-
tion and acceptance by each Project Company of the work and
assets comprising its Project and insures on-going maintenance
of that Project, including in respect of its structural integrity. In
accordance with Shari'ah precepts, each Owner, as the title-
holder of its Improvements, retains some of the exposure on
these items. The liability exposure of each Owner for such de-
fects and conditions will be limited by express substantive provi-
sions and by provisions that limit the payment obligation of that
Owner to amounts actually collected under applicable warran-
ties, performance bonds, completion bonds, guarantees, insur-
ance policies, and similar documents and instruments. Simi-
larly, claims of the Project Companies under each respective
Lease (Ijara), and other documents, against each of the respec-
tive Owners, including as the Lessor and the owner of the re-
lated Project, are limited to amounts collectible from the rele-
vant Managing Contractor, the relevant General Contractor, the
Construction Arranger (in Truman Park), and relevant insur-
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ance policies, performance bonds, completion bonds, warran-
ties, guarantees, and similar documents and instruments.
The Managing Contractor also has responsibility for enforc-
ing the insurance agreements, condemnation award proceed-
ings, performance bonds, completion bonds, warranties, and
similar documents and instruments in respect of the related Pro-
ject, although these obligations and related rights are restricted
in various situations (such as default scenarios) and are subject
to defined parameters. This arrangement removes the Owner
from involvement in the enforcement process to the greatest
possible extent. The Managing Contractor Agreement extends
to enforcement, on behalf of the relevant Owner, of any claim
under the Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement that such Owner
may have against the Maconda General Contractor, in the
Maconda Park transaction, or the Truman General Contractor
and the Construction Arranger, in the Truman Park transaction.
As a corollary, in any circumstance where the claim of a Project
Company relates to any matter covered by insurance, bonds, war-
ranties, or similar arrangements, that Project Company's dam-
age recovery will be limited to amounts recovered thereunder or
otherwise from the relevant General Contractor (and the Con-
struction Arranger, in Truman Park).
7. Tax Matters Agreement; Other Documents
The Tax Matters Agreement has been designed to afford
legal recognition to the fact that the istisna'a-ijara structure is a
financing arrangement under applicable United States law. Va-
rious characterizations are also made under relevant state law
(for example, New York law for the financing, and the relevant
state law for mortgage and other real property purposes). These
characterizations may be somewhat different than those appear-
ing in the Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement or the Lease
(Ijara). For example, the Tax Matters Agreement clarifies that
the entire transaction is, for purposes of United States tax law
and applicable state law, a loan financing, and that all amounts
(other than costs and expenses) payable to an Owner in excess
of the Total Construction Cost are to treated as interest for
United States tax and bank regulatory purposes. This is impor-
tant in order to allocate tax benefits (such as depreciation, inter-
est deductions, and various project expenses) to each Project
Company (and thus to the General Partner or Managing Mem-
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ber and the Islamic Investors). It additionally allows payments to
Islamic Investors that are not U.S. persons to be made without
tax withholding in accordance with the relevant portfolio inter-
est provisions of U.S. tax laws. Environmental matters are also
addressed in this agreement, with the relevant Project Company
having all risks in respect thereof as regards any exposure of the
relevant Owner.
Various consents and other documents have been struc-
tured to specifically address structural matters, including Shari'ah
principles. For example, payment obligations of the relevant
Owner under the Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement cannot be
conditioned on the status, actions, or omissions of its Lessee
under the Lease (Ijara). Thus, a default by, or bankruptcy of, a
Lessee will not relieve an Owner of its obligation to make pay-
ment to the Maconda General Contractor or the Construction
Arranger under the Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement, except
in certain circumstances. Documents have been structured to
address this difference from a conventional construction financ-
ing in a manner that puts the various parties, as nearly as possi-
ble, in the same position they would occupy in such a conven-
tional financing. This is effected in part by documents that pro-
vide for agreed methods of enforcement of claims and agreed
limitations on damage amounts and sources of damage awards
or compensation in delineated circumstances. For example, in
certain situations awards and damages are limited to amounts
collected in respect of insurance policies, warranties, perform-
ance bonds, completion bonds, guarantees, other similar docu-
ments and instruments, and other security and amounts availa-
ble from the estate of the bankrupt entity. In other situations,
mandatory and voluntary assignments of rights and assumptions
of liabilities, temporary and permanent, are operative to reallo-
cate risk and responsibility to effect the allocations that would
exist in a conventional financing.
CONCLUSION
The application of Islamic structures to project financings is
in the early stages, just as the development of a true Islamic
economy is in its infancy. The transactions described in this Es-
say, and others, are efforts to lay the critical base and explore the
use of a variety of Islamic techniques within a framework that
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must acknowledge the critical security, credit, economic, cul-
tural, religious, and legal concerns of both Western and Islamic
participants. The techniques and structures thus far imple-
mented will be further refined to achieve simplicity, greater eco-
nomics of implementation, and a smooth interface between a
Western interest-based system and an Islamic interest-averse sys-
tem. New structures are being developed as more and more
Western financial institutions move into Islamic banking, which
is an accelerating trend.
The Saudi Chevron structure is now the basis for a wide vari-
ety of project financings and other secured lending transactions
in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in Islamic jurisdictions. Lending
transactions of all types are incorporating the possessory con-
cepts relating to a rahn of a marhoun, even where additional col-
lateral is available to secure the loan. Various business groups, as
well as banks, are considering ways in which to use the rahn-adl
structure to promote residential housing finance in Saudi Arabia
where the absence of a dependable collateral security system
(and, particularly, the unavailability of recordation of security in-
terests) has resulted in an unavailability of financing for home
purchases by anyone that is not wealthy. The rahn-adl structure
has been implemented in the collateralization of large equip-
ment leases and fleet leases. Proposals are being discussed for
the establishment of a private security interest recordation sys-
tem in Saudi Arabia to achieve the broadest possible achieve-
ment of notice of a rahn. As lender comfort increases, there
should be decreased reliance on personal and corporate guaran-
tees and greater use of secured financing techniques. This
would allow individuals and companies to deploy assets over a
wider investment base and banks to make loans of longer tenor,
increasing capital investment throughout the economy.
The adl structure is also being implemented in diverse
transactions. These range from employee stock participation
programs to securitizations to debt instrument issuances to pro-
ject financings. The increased certainty and stability of adl ar-
rangements will insure that its use becomes commonplace in
capital market transactions as well.
The author is unaware of any use of the sharikat mahassa-
murabaha structure in project financings other than in the fi-
nancing of the Utility Power Project. The structure does hold
promise for use in similar financings although the Shari'ah issues
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involved in this structure are somewhat more problematic than
those in other structures.
The Maconda Park/Truman Park istisna'a-ijara structure is
being widely used, particularly in residential, commercial, and
industrial real estate projects throughout the world. The availa-
bility of a practical Islamic structure of this type has also given
rise to the development of a range of related Islamic financial
products. For example, the author is currently working on a
number of real estate funds that will invest in properties and
projects in Europe, Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, Ca-
nada, and the United States. The majority of those funds will
investment in residential real estate projects in the United States,
all financed using the istisna'a-ijara structure. Those projects will
be diversified as to geography, tenant base, and other character-
istics. The funds will be sold to Islamic investors, primarily in the
Middle East and Europe. A similar fund will use Islamic acquisi-
tion (primarily ijara) and istisna'a-ijara techniques to invest, ini-
tially, in commercial (primarily) and residential and industrial
properties in Australia, New Zealand, France, Japan, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United
States. This fund has obvious geographical risk diversification.
It is also being structured to provide industrial and credit diversi-
fication through its focus on leases to select tenants in different
Shai'ah-compliant industries. A Shari'ah screen, similar to those
used for Shari'ah-compliant equity funds, will be applied to te-
nants under the various iara agreements implementing the
financings." 1 That fund will be sold to Islamic investors in the
Middle East and Europe. The istisna'a-ijara structure is also be-
ing applied to equipment and vessel financings, including
Shari'ah-compliant ijara charter parties for liquified natural gas
tankers. This will enable Islamic construction financing for
those vessels and the development of related financial instru-
ments to allow Islamic investment in those financings.
We are on the threshold of a bright future for Shari'ah-com-
pliant project financing. The structures discussed in this Essay,
and many others, are being developed to facilitate Shari'ah-com-
pliant financings with joint participation, as to both equity and
101. See, e.g., DowJones Islamic Market Indexes, at http://indexes.dowjones.com/
djimi/imiinvest.html; IBFNET, at http://islamic-finance.net/islamic-equity/eq-
uityl.html; Abdul Hamid, supra note 99, at 91-101.
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"debt equivalent" financing, by Western and Islamic investors
and financiers. This is leading to greater familiarity of Western
financiers with the Islamic market and its significant opportuni-
ties and Islamic investors and their sensitivities. And that, in
turn, is resulting in enhanced interest and involvement of West-
ern financial institutions in the development of not only Islamic
project financing techniques, but a wide range of other Islamic
financial products. From the vantage of both financiers and le-
gal practitioners, there is a marked movement toward the devel-
opment of an Islamic alternative to each Western financial prod-
uct.
